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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SPECIALIZED
TRIALS FOR TERRORISM
Sudha Setty*
“An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to
misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this
1
duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.”

I. INTRODUCTION
President Obama has made clear that the United States must grapple with
questions of how to detain and try potentially dangerous terrorism suspects in a
manner that maximizes national security while adhering to the rule of law.2 Yet the
United States faces a serious quandary in terms of how to prosecute suspects who
have been detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that puts at risk the reputation of the
United States justice system and its adherence to rule of law.3

* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B., Stanford;
J.D., Columbia Law School. I owe great thanks to those who discussed with me the ideas in this Article,
or who reviewed and commented on drafts, including Rick Abel, Fabio Arcila, Bridgette Baldwin, Erin
Buzuvis, Lauren Carasik, Matthew Charity, Robert Chesney, John Ip, Tayyab Mahmud, Peter
Margulies, Gregory McNeal, Bruce Miller, Giovanna Shay, Robert Statchen, and Arthur Wolf. I am
grateful for the insight and commentary of participants at the University of Texas Law School 2010
National Security Workshop, the 2010 meeting of the Law & Society Association, as well as at
conferences at American University, Washington School of Law, and at the University at Buffalo Law
School, where I presented drafts of this paper. Finally, I thank Sara Fawk for her excellent research
assistance and law librarian Renee Rastorfer for her valuable help.
1. THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1795).
2. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security, Speech delivered
by President Barack Obama (May 21, 2009, 10:28 AM EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter President’s Remarks]. As the President explained:
Guantanamo set back the moral authority that is America’s strongest currency in the
world. Instead of building a durable framework for the struggle against al Qaeda that
drew upon our deeply held values and traditions, our government was defending
positions that undermined the rule of law. . . . [We] will make our military commissions a
more credible and effective means of administering justice, and I will work with
Congress and members of both parties, as well as legal authorities across the political
spectrum, on legislation to ensure that these commissions are fair, legitimate, and
effective.
Id.
3. See,
e.g.,
Political
Punch,
ABCNEWS.COM
(June
9,
2009,
5:01
PM),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/06/todays-qs-for-os-wh-692009.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2010) (in response to a reporter’s question regarding the credibility of the United States’ criminal justice
system, White House spokesperson Robert Gibbs declines to confirm that suspects who are found “not
guilty” in United States’ courts would be released). The impression that the post-September 11 military
commissions were created to circumvent the rule of law and Constitution has cast doubt on the
credibility of the United States as a leader on developing governmental procedures that comport with the
rule of law.
See, e.g., Editorial, A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/16/opinion/a-travesty-of-justice.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
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The question of what trial system to use for suspected terrorists requires an
historical interrogation of how and to what effect the United States has used
specialized courts for wartime trials previously and whether Article III courts or the
military justice system could have handled such trials. Further, the government’s
choice to use a specialized court system must be understood within the context of
deciding whether certain groups of people are deemed more suitable than others to
be tried in a specialized court.
Countries facing similar questions have come to different conclusions about
the constitutionality and efficacy of specialized courts. Some nations treat acts of
terrorism as a criminal matter and use their ordinary criminal justice systems to try
accused terrorists.4 Other nations facing serious national security issues, including
the United Kingdom, Israel, and India, have used specialized courts or trial
procedures to prosecute some terrorism cases, with mixed results in terms of
efficacy, preservation of rights, benefits to national security, adherence to the rule
of law, and the public perception of the rule of law and institutional legitimacy. As
nations that share both a legal heritage and the burden of dealing with serious
national security threats with the United States, their experience offers guidance in

4. See, e.g., Turkey: Life in Prison for 6 al-Qaida Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 10, 2009,
5:08 AM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/Jun/10/eu-turkey-al-qaida-trial-061009/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010) (a Turkish appellate court approved of life imprisonment terms for six suspects
and lesser sentences for thirty-three other suspects of the 2003 fatal bombings of synagogues, a bank
and a British consular office); Nicholas Kulish, Suspects Plan Guilty Pleas in Terror Case in Germany,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/europe/10germany.html?_
r=1&src=twt&twt=nytimes (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (four suspects, accused of membership in
terrorist organizations and of planning bombings in Germany, plan to plead guilty to charges that would
bring a prison sentence of twenty to thirty years); 14 Terror Suspects to Go Straight to Trial, THE
CANADIAN PRESS (Sept. 24, 2007, 4:45 PM ET), http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/
20070924/terror_trial_070924/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (moving forward with a trial for fourteen
suspects accused of plotting to bomb the Canadian Parliament and assassinate Prime Minister Stephen
Harper); Duncan Gardham, Key al-Qaeda Figure to be Sentenced, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Dec. 18,
2008, 10:44 PM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3835870/Key-al-Qaeda-figure-to-besentenced.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (the United Kingdom’s Manchester Crown Court convicted
an al-Qaeda suspect of “directing the activities of an organisation to commit acts of terrorism,” among
other charges); Saurav Shukla, India Files Charges Against Mumbai Terrorist Suspects, TOP NEWS
LAW (Feb. 25, 2009, 15:28), http://www.topnews.in/law/india-files-charges-against-mumbai-terroristsuspects (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (reporting on the preparations in India for the criminal trial of a
suspect in the November 2008 Mumbai hotel bombings); Al Goodman, Court Convicts “Spanish
Taliban,” CNN.COM (Oct. 5, 2005, 14:03 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/
europe/10/05/spain.terror.conviction/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (conviction and prison
sentence of six years for Spanish member of al-Qaeda); Dutch Terror Suspects Go On Trial, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 16, 2006, 14:02 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6054324.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010)
(describing how those convicted in Dutch courts for membership in terrorist organizations have been
sentenced to fifteen years in prison).
Of course, the decision of other nations to use an ordinary criminal court for the prosecution of
terrorism suspects does not mean that the due process protections that are used in those nations are
comparable to what is constitutionally mandated in the United States. See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Who
Needs Jacques Bauer?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2007), http://www.opinionjournal.com/
wsj/?id=110009712 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (noting that French law allows counterterrorism officials
to conduct surveillance, search private property and detain suspects with greater ease than their United
States counterparts because the United States Constitution offers greater individual rights with regard to
these issues).
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evaluating the tensions raised by the use of specialized terrorism courts and trials
and insight into whether such specialized processes can realistically exist in
compliance with the rule of law.
In recent years, the United States has been willing to consider and possibly
adopt counterterrorism tactics—including the use of specialized courts for
terrorism trials—from other countries when those tactics are perceived to be
successful.5 This engagement in comparative national security policy analysis can
be fruitful only if paired with consideration of the short- and long-term efficacy of
those policy choices in context, which is what this Article seeks to address.
Part I of this Article examines the Obama administration’s resuscitation of
military commissions in the United States. Analyzing the policy considerations of
using Article III courts or regularly constituted courts martial to try suspected
terrorists, this Part considers how the use of military commissions on specific
populations may undermine their long-term effectiveness.
Part II examines from a comparative perspective how specialized courts were
established and utilized in the United Kingdom, Israel, and India. This Part
analyzes the context and impetus for creation of specialized courts and addresses
the legal and societal impact of specialized trial systems.
Part III considers how the United States recent experience with specialized
courts fits into the comparative context and what lessons the country can draw from
the experiences of other nations that have been grappling with similar questions of
national security law and policy.
II. WHY SPECIALIZED TERRORISM TRIALS?
Two threshold issues are relevant when addressing the question of whether to
use a specialized trial system to try suspected terrorists: What is the justification for
a specialized trial system and does such a system offer adequate due process
protections, such that it can comport with the rule of law and, importantly in terms
of alienation of certain communities, is perceived to comport with the rule of law?6
5. See, e.g., Catching Terrorists: the British System Versus the U.S. System, Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, Sen. Hrg. 109-701, 109th Cong. 2-19 (2006) [hereinafter
Catching Terrorists]. In this hearing, the subcommittee heard testimony from Judge Richard Posner,
former Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo, and Tom Parker, a former British counterterrorism
official. All three witnesses testified in favor of the adoption of various British counterterrorism
measures, including the specialized terrorism courts used in Northern Ireland known as the Diplock
Courts. Id. at 5-6 (Judge Posner’s commendation of the Diplock Courts). Judge Posner noted his
enthusiasm for engaging in comparative national security policy analysis:
We must not be too proud to learn from nations such as the United Kingdom that have a
much longer history of dealing with serious terrorist threats than the United States
has . . . . The United Kingdom is a particularly apt model for us to consider in crafting
our counterterrorist policies because our political and legal culture is derivative from
England’s.
Id. at 4 (Judge Posner’s prepared statement).
6. Although definitions of the rule of law vary, bedrock principles common to most definitions
include: that the law should be uniform; that the law should be known in advance; and that the
application of the law should be equal to all people. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times
of Stress, 70 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 455, 457 (2002) (listing common elements of the rule of law); Michel
Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307
(2001) (examining the idea of the rule of law in England and in the United States).
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Traditionally, the United States has used the criminal justice system and
Article III courts to try accused terrorists and the courts martial system to try lawful
combatants for violations of the laws of armed conflict. Supporters of the military
commission system or other types of specialized courts highlight the purported
deficiencies of the criminal justice system and the inapplicability of the courts
martial system to try cases in which terrorist acts are alleged.
A. The Use of Criminal Prosecution for Terrorist Acts
The United States has historically shied away from specialized trials for
terrorist attacks. In fact, many incidents of international and domestic terrorism
directly impacting the United States since the 1970s7 have been dealt with using the
criminal justice system. In part, this policy is intended to affirm the rule of law in
the United States and to maintain the United States’ reputation in the international
community as a nation with a justice system that accords all defendants with the
same sets of rights and procedural protections.8 This equal application of the law
has also benefited the United States from a utilitarian perspective by denying antiAmerican groups the right to claim that the United States is singling out one
particular group (whether based on nationality, religion, or other characteristic) for
particularly onerous procedural burdens at trial.9
The United States’ focus on the rule of law and its concomitant procedural
protections10 were maintained even as terrorism on United States soil became a
more pressing concern following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, in
which six people were killed,11 and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
7. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., United States, in COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN
COUNTRIES 23 (Alexander Yonah, ed., 2002).
8. This reputation for a justice system with exceptionally strong protections for defendants is open
to critique. See generally James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped
Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009). Forman notes that
“we are insufficiently self-reflective . . . . [W]e hav[e] one of the most punitive systems in the world
while believing we have one of the most liberal.” Id. at 337.
9. See Editorial, Photographs and Kangaroo Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at WK11
(“Republicans like to mock the notion of trying terrorists as criminals, but that is what they are.
Treating them as warriors not only demeans civilian and military justice, but it gives terrorists the
martyrdom they crave”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE CASE AGAINST A SPECIAL TERRORISM COURT 3
(2009) (“Unjust detentions and trials at Guantanamo have fueled animosity toward the United States.
These decisions also have undermined U.S. efforts to advance the rule of law around the world, which is
critical to confronting the threat of terrorism. Creating a special terrorism court . . . would perpetuate
these errors”).
10. Those ordinary civilian courts were not always in the United States, as allies of the United
States also actively prosecuted terrorism cases in which the interests of the United States were
implicated. For example, in 1985, the Achille Lauro cruise ship was hijacked and one United States
citizen was killed. David Ensor, U.S. Captures Mastermind of Achille Lauro Hijacking, CNN.COM (Apr.
16, 2003, 5:10 EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/15/sprj.irq.abbas.arrested/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010). The United States was unable to conduct the prosecutions of the captured
attackers because of a lack of jurisdiction, see Wilcox, supra note 7, at 35, but Italy convicted and
imprisoned some of the hijackers through the ordinary Italian criminal justice system. Alan Cowell,
Hijacker Defends Achille Lauro Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1988, at A3.
11. Benjamin Weiser, Mastermind Gets Life for Bombing of World Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 1998, at A1. See also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming convictions for
conspiracy to attack the World Trade Center).
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Building in Oklahoma City in 1995,12 in which 168 people were killed.13 In both
cases, the attackers were prosecuted and convicted in federal court.14 Likewise, the
so-called “Unabomber” case, in which Theodore Kaczynski pled guilty in 1998 to
sending sixteen mail bombs over the course of seventeen years that resulted in the
deaths of three people, was handled in federal court.15
The prosecution of members of al-Qaeda for attacks on United States citizens
both inside and outside of the United States was, by and large, treated as a criminal
matter under the pre-September 11 policies of the United States. In 1998, members
of al-Qaeda bombed United States embassy buildings in Kenya and Tanzania,
killing 224 people.16 Those attackers, captured soon thereafter, were tried in
federal court and sentenced to life imprisonment.17 One suspect, Ahmed Khalfan
Ghailani, was detained by United States forces in 2004, held in secret prisons,
eventually moved to the United States’ prison at Guantanamo Bay in 2009, and was
brought to face trial in the Southern District of New York in 2009.18
In the post-September 11, 2001 era, powerful tools have been made available
to prosecutors to try individuals even tangentially related to dangerous acts or to
groups labeled by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.19
Prosecutors have made ample use of the criminalization of associational status
and/or membership in a terrorist organization.20 Material support charges have
been used extensively to try terrorism suspects or to exert pressure toward a plea
bargain, and are often successful.21 Unlike other crimes often invoked to prosecute
12. Wilcox, supra note 7, at 23.
13. Jo Thomas, McVeigh Guilty on All Counts in the Oklahoma City Bombing; Jury to Weigh Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1997, at A1.
14. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (imposing death sentence on
Timothy McVeigh for 1993 Oklahoma City bombing); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir.
2003) (affirming convictions for World Trade Center bombings).
15. William Glaberson, The Unabomber Case: The Overview; Kaczynski Avoids A Death Sentence
With Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at A1. See also United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108
(9th Cir. 2001) (upholding denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea).
16. Phil Hirschkorn, Four Embassy Bombers Get Life, CNN.COM (Oct. 21, 2001, 10:58 AM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
17. Id.
18. Benjamin Weiser, A Plea of Not Guilty for Guantanamo Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009,
at A25. Ghailani was indicted for his alleged role in the bombings in 1998. See United States v.
Ghailani, 686 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In November 2010, Ghailani was convicted of
conspiracy to destroy government property. See Benjamin Weiser, Detainee Acquitted on Most Counts
in ’98 Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1.
19. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2010) (designating forty-six organizations as foreign terrorist organizations as of August 6, 2010). See
also 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2005) (authorizing the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a
“foreign terrorist organization”); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238,
1242 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding “that due process require[s] the disclosure of only the unclassified
portions of the administrative record”).
20. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (2008)
(discussing material support statute and “group membership liability”).
21. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Minneapolis, Minneapolis
Man Sentenced for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Qaeda, (July 9, 2009),
http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp070909.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (describing
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terror suspects, such as continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)22 and violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),23 which require at
least some predicate act for criminal liability to attach,24 the material support
statute does not require the defendant to have had a specific intent to support a
terrorist act—knowing support of a designated terrorist organization without intent
is sufficient to convict.25 The scope and flexibility offered by the material support
statute has made it an often-used26 tool for prosecutors and was used to convict
John Walker Lindh,27 Ahmed Omar Abu Ali,28 and the so-called “Lackawanna
Six,”29 among others.
The government also has used Article III courts proactively, to prevent
planned terrorist acts from occurring30 and to elicit valuable counterterrorism and
intelligence information as part of the interrogation, negotiation, and plea bargain
process.31 The federal material witness statute, which empowers the government to
the guilty plea of Mohammed Abdullah Warsame to charges of material support for al Qaeda, which
resulted in a prison sentence of ninety-two months); Philip Coorey, Hicks Case Flawed All Along:
Prosecutor, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/04/
29/1209234862811.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (detailing how David Hicks plead guilty to material
support charges because he believed it was the only realistic means to end his detention at Guantanamo
and be returned to his native Australia).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2008).
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
24. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2008) (defining racketeering as involving at least two acts in
furtherance of the illegal plan).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000). See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: TerrorismSupport Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 16-18 (2005) (detailing the breadth
of the application of the material support statute); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity:
Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 200-07
(2003) (same).
26. The scope of the material support statute and the ability of prosecutors to indict and convict a
broad swath of defendants under the statute have provoked criticism that the statute’s lack of a specific
intent requirement renders it fundamentally unfair to defendants and arguably unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Zeinab Taleb-Jedi’s Pre-Trial Motions, United
States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 06 CR 652 (BMC), 2008 WL 8093630
(arguing, unsuccessfully, that the material support statute is unconstitutional). The United States
Supreme Court has rejected those arguments and affirmed the constitutionality of the material support
statute. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
27. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002) (entering guilty plea in violation
of, among other things, the material support statute).
28. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
See STEPHEN I. VLADECK, TRYING TERRORISM SUSPECTS IN ARTICLE III COURTS: THE LESSONS OF
UNITED STATES V. ABU ALI (Issue Brief, American Constitution Society) (Aug. 2010) (using the Abu Ali
case to analyze the ability of Article III courts to handle terrorism cases).
29. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney, W. Dist. of N.Y., United States Attorney’s
Office Successfully Concludes Terrorism Case With Sixth Conviction of Al Qaeda Supporter (May 19,
2003) (announcing the conviction of Muhktar al-Bakri).
30. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, Terrorist in ‘99 U.S. Case is Sentenced to 22 Years, N.Y. TIMES (July
28, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E7DC103FF93BA15754C0A9639
C8B63 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (describing the detention of Ahmed Ressam two weeks prior to the
execution of his planned attack).
31. See Jeff Zeleny & Charlie Savage, Official Says Terrorism Suspect is Cooperating, N.Y.TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2010, at A11 (noting that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, arrested in conjunction with his alleged
attempt to use explosives on a United States-bound airline flight on December 25, 2009, has cooperated
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detain and question individuals without charge,32 has enhanced the ability of law
enforcement to detain individuals with potentially relevant information for
terrorism prosecutions, but it has also increased the potential for abuse of discretion
and abuse of executive power.33 Nevertheless, the statute remains a potent tool for
prosecutors within the ordinary criminal justice system. Perhaps ironically,
although individual defendants and civil libertarians have objected to the scope and
application of the material support and material witness statutes, the main criticism
of using the criminal law to prosecute terrorism is that the tools available to
prosecutors are not strong enough given the level of protections guaranteed to
criminal defendants under the Constitution.
B. Constitutional Protections in Criminal Courts
A primary criticism of using ordinary civilian courts for terrorism prosecutions
is that these courts offer too many protections to allegedly dangerous people.34 The
criminal justice system affords defendants a framework of rights grounded in the
United States Constitution and developed over two centuries of constitutional
amendment, statutory clarification, and jurisprudence. Included among these
protections are various constitutional guarantees, such as due process of law,35 the
right to confront accusers and witnesses,36 protection against arbitrariness in the
application of the law,37 and protection against selective prosecution based on race,

extensively with law enforcement officials and offered valuable information pertaining to al-Qaeda);
Television Interview by David Gregory with John Brennan, Assistant to the President and Deputy Nat’l
Sec. Adviser for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, on Meet the Press (Jan. 3, 2010), transcript
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34665249/ns/meet_the_press// (last visited Oct. 19, 2010)
(noting that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab may give valuable intelligence to United States law
enforcement as part of a plea bargain for the criminal case pending against him regarding his).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
33. The government used the material witness statute broadly after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, arresting hundreds of people and detaining them for up to several months. See, e.g.,
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2005). At least one court has found that the government—and former Attorney General John Ashcroft,
personally—may be liable for abusing the material witness statute in the unwarranted detention and
harsh treatment of those detained under the statute. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that the detention and treatment of plaintiff Abdullah al-Kidd under the material witness
statute may give rise to personal liability, since al-Kidd was never accused of criminal activity and was
never asked to act as a witness in a criminal prosecution). International Humanitarian Law authorizes
detention of those who participate in hostilities or pose a serious security threat, but only in the case of
an international armed conflict between two states. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.S.T. 3315; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.S.T. 3316.
34. Michael B. Mukasey, Civilian Courts Are No Place to Try Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
2009, at A21 (describing the potential disadvantages of using civilian courts for terrorism trials,
including juror intimidation, disclosure of classified information, higher security costs for the trial,
inability to use certain evidence, low probability of a death sentence being handed down, and the
possibility of defendants proselytizing to other people being held in pretrial detention).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. U.S. CONST. amends. V, IXV, § 1.
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national origin, religion or color.38 Criminal trials also require—among other
obligations—that the government prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt”
before conviction,39 that admissible evidence conform to the applicable evidentiary
rules,40 the right to discovery of relevant evidence in the government’s
possession,41 and that exculpatory evidence be turned over to the defendant.42 This
framework of rights and obligations exists to fulfill the traditional goals of the
criminal justice system—punishment, public safety, and deterrence—and to limit
the number of wrongful convictions.43
The criminal justice model has shown some flexibility in trying defendants for
acts of terrorism, and prosecutors have been successful in Article III courts44 in
convicting those who have actively participated in violent acts,45 provided material
support to the active participants,46 and those who have been affiliated with or were
members of groups that are designated as terrorist organizations by the
government.47
The use of the ordinary criminal justice system further sends a powerful
message to defendants, international allies, and to organizations intent on
demonizing the United States and its foreign policy—the message that adherence to
the rule of law is a bedrock principle that applies to all defendants, even those
professing to seek the destruction of the United States. As such, focus on the rule
of law serves to defuse rhetoric that the United States treats certain groups of
individuals unfairly. Arguably, this improves long-term security by strengthening
international alliances, increasing cooperation and positive relations with alienated
communities, and reducing the possibility of extremism manifesting itself in
violent acts.48
C. Limitations of Criminal Courts for Terrorism Trials
Proponents of a specialized court for terrorism trials—whether in the form of a
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IXV, § 1. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)
(setting forth the constitutional standard for proving a selective prosecution claim).
39. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
40. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (limiting the use of prejudicial evidence).
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
42. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
43. Cf. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 1088 (arguing that the rights afforded by the
criminal justice system “operationalize the idea that it is better for some guilty persons to go free than
for one innocent person to be convicted of a crime”).
44. E.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 161 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming convictions for the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center).
45. E.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 482 (4th Cir. 2004).
46. E.g., United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 172-74 (3rd Cir. 2007) (affirming conviction for
attempted weapons sales).
47. E.g., United States v. Afshari, NO. CR 01-209(C) DOC, 2009 WL 1033791, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 14, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion challenging designation as a foreign terrorist organization).
48. See Tom Tyler, et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A
Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 368-69 (2010) (finding a “robust correlation
between perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate
among Muslim American communities in the context of anti-terrorism policing” and noting that under a
normative model of anti-terrorism measures, “people obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities
when they view government as legitimate and thus entitled to be obeyed”).
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National Security Court49 or a revived military commission system—cite several
reasons why ordinary criminal courts are inadequate to deal with post-9/11
terrorism trials. First, critics fear that an Article III trial would create an
unacceptable risk of revealing sensitive or classified information that could then
endanger national security interests.50 This criticism is blunted to some extent by
the use of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), the 1980 law that
established procedures for the use of classified information in criminal trials.51
CIPA outlines a comprehensive set of procedures when evidence in criminal cases
implicates classified information. For example, CIPA allows the government—in
some instances—to substitute unclassified summaries of classified evidence.52 The
Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush acknowledged the need to deal with
classified information in a sensitive and thoughtful manner, and expressed
confidence that ordinary criminal courts and Article III judges would be able to
manage the task successfully.53
Second, proponents of specialized terrorism trials argue that ordinary criminal
trials—with Sixth Amendment54 guarantees of a right to a public trial,55 right to be

49. Other proposals for a specialized court for terrorism trials in the United States have been
proposed but not adopted, such as the establishment of a national security court. See, e.g., Jack
Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (proposing a hybrid
model of national security courts for trying suspected terrorists. Such a model would involve elements
of the criminal justice system and the military trial system, and would call for the appointment of Article
III judges who are experts in national security matters and the laws of war); Amos N. Guiora, Military
Commissions and National Security Courts After Guantanamo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 199,
207 (2008) (also proposing a national security court). Such proposals are themselves subject to criticism
for unwarranted assumptions about the lack of efficacy of an Article III court, secrecy, lack of due
process protections, and weakening of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES
J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
(Human Rights First, 2008); see also Mark R. Shulman, National Security Courts: Star Chamber or
Specialized Justice?, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 546 (2009) (arguing that Article III courts are
capable of handling complex and sensitive national security cases).
50. See Jack Goldsmith, The Laws in Wartime: Boost Trust, Close Guantanamo, and Establish a
National Security Court, SLATE.COM (Apr. 2, 2008, 7:12 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2187870/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010); Michael B. Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law: Terror Trials Hurt the
Nation Even When They Lead to Convictions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15 (arguing that
“terrorism prosecutions in this country have unintentionally provided terrorists with a rich source of
intelligence” and citing two instances in which valuable intelligence information was lost or leaked in
conjunction with the trials of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers); but see Zabel & Benjamin, supra
note 49, at 25-26 (rejecting Mukasey’s argument and noting the efficacy of CIPA in keeping classified
information secret in several trials, including United States v. Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 498, 499-501
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) and Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 244-45).
51. Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025.
52. Id. at § 6.
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. 6.
55. Trials can be closed if publicity would interfere with the trial and undermine the defendant’s
right to a fair trial, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355 (1966), or if there is “an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.” Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 10
(1986) (quoting Press-Enter Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984)).
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tried by a jury, right to confront adverse witnesses for the defendants,56 and right to
counsel—are inappropriate because of the security risks to witnesses, jurors,
prosecutors, and court personnel.57 These Sixth Amendment protections are
essential to effecting equal treatment of defendants, and importantly, the perception
that the rule of law is being upheld. Additionally, use of these protections arguably
benefits even short-term national security interests by encouraging defendants who
have been assigned counsel to cooperate with the government in exchange for
leniency in the sentencing phase.58
Third, proponents of a revived military commission system are concerned
about the lack of evidence that would be admissible and usable in an Article III
court, particularly if prisoners are captured outside of the United States and in a
battlefield situation where gathering usable evidence may be extremely difficult.59
Additionally, Article III courts would likely deny the admissibility of evidence
helpful to the prosecution offered by prisoners who were subjected to torture or
enhanced interrogation techniques, leading to a more challenging, if not
impossible, task for prosecutors.60
Fourth, and derived from the previous critique, is the concern that trials in an
Article III court would lead to inappropriately short sentences and a substantial
number of acquittals, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners who—
according to the government—continue to pose a threat to United States’ national
security.61 This argument has significant political traction,62 particularly since the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay have often been described by government officials as
the “worst of the worst,”63 even when that claim has been subsequently debunked
56. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (extending the confrontation right for
defendants to all testimonial witnesses).
57. See Mukasey, supra note 34 (arguing against the use of ordinary criminal courts to try terrorists
because of the concomitant heightened security risks).
58. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 54, at 118 (“[T]he government recognizes that cultivating
cooperation pleas is an effective intelligence gathering tool for all types of criminal investigations,
including significant terrorist cases.”). See also Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal Criminal
Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 837, 847 (2007).
59. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531-32 (2004) (acknowledging concerns regarding the
chain of custody of evidence gathered on the battlefield).
60. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, United States v. Ghailani, 1:98-cr-01023-LAK (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2010) (excluding the testimony of a witness based on the grounds that “the government has
failed to prove that Abebe’s testimony is sufficiently attenuated from Ghailani’ s coerced statements to
permit its receipt in evidence”).
61. President’s Remarks, supra note 2.
62. Editorial, The Politics of Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at A24 (noting that some Republican
politicians had objected strongly to trying suspects of terrorism acts in Article III courts as opposed to
military commissions for political advantage); Television Interview by David Gregory with John
Brennan, Assistant to the President and Deputy Nat’l Sec. Adviser for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, on Meet the Press (Jan. 3, 2010), transcript available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34665249/ns/meet_the_press// (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
63. See Taxi to the Dark Side (ThinkFilm 2007) (montage of television footage in which Bush
administration officials described the detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison facility as “the worst of
the worst”); Television Interview by John King with Tom Ridge, on State of the Union with John King,
CNN.COM (May 24, 2009, 9:00 PM), transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0905/24/sotu.01.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (noting the concern of politicians
about bringing Guantanamo detainees into the United States for trial and/or imprisonment because of
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or proven to be overblown.64
This fear of leniency or acquittal, however, is tempered by the track record of
Article III courts, which have on occasion handed down significantly harsher
sentences than military commissions with regard to comparable crimes.65
Furthermore, Article III courts have available the death penalty for many terrorismrelated crimes66 and appellate courts have been willing to remand cases for harsher
sentencing.67
D. The Push for Military Commissions
The Bush administration decided immediately after the September 11 attacks
that it had the right to try most prisoners captured in pursuit of the attackers by
military commission.68 In doing so, the Bush administration rejected the idea that
the attacks ought to be treated as a criminal matter, and even in the context of
treating the attacks as an act of war, made a deliberate choice not to import the
protections mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the courts
martial system into the process for trying detainees.69
Although this decision was problematic in terms of perceptions of justice
among affected groups, it was not constitutionally impermissible. Since 2001, the
United States Supreme Court has had the opportunity to flesh out some parameters
for the establishment of constitutionally sound military commissions. Both Hamdi

their purported dangerousness to the public); and Michael Melia, Gitmo Detainee Allowed to Contact
Top Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(May 3, 2008), http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/
modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=34472 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (quoting a Justice
Department civilian prosecutor as describing Salim Ahmed Hamdan as “the worst of the worst”).
Hamdan was later acquitted of most charges against him before a military commission, but was
convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda. See Jerry Markon, Hamdan Guilty of Terror
Support, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2008, at A01.
64. Coorey, supra note 21 (recalling the early characterization by the Bush Administration of
former Guantanamo detainee David Hicks as “the worst of the worst;” prosecutors later believed that
Hicks was not a dangerous individual).
65. For example, pursuant to a plea agreement, Lindh was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.
See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
66. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
67. E.g., United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) (vacating the twenty-two-year
sentence for Ahmed Ressam, convicted of planning to set off explosives at the Los Angeles
International Airport on December 31, 1999, and calling for a harsher sentence to be applied).
68. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
69. The Bush administration argued that detainees in the “war on terror” should not be accorded the
Prisoner of War (POW) status, which would carry with it the right to a trial by court martial. Under the
definition of POW articulated in the Third Geneva Convention, to be afforded POW status, detainees
must fulfill four conditions: (1) the presence of a commander responsible for subordinates; (2) the
presence of a fixed distinguishing sign that may be identified from a distance; (3) the open and
unconcealed carrying of arms and actions undertaken in accordance with the rules; and (4) customs of
law. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3315. Though detainees may seek POW status as a means to avoid civilian or military trial,
courts have been unsympathetic to such claims. See Hamdi 542 U.S. at 514 (recognizing the right to
designate prisoners as “enemy combatants” and detain them); DC (TA) 092134/02 State of Israel v.
Marwan Barghouti (2002) (holding that suspected terrorists are not entitled to POW status because they
do not fulfill the criteria stated in the Third Geneva Convention).
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v. Rumsfeld70 and Boumediene v. Bush71 made clear that military commissions can
be constitutionally sound and are a viable alternative to the use of Article III courts,
should the administration prefer to try suspected terrorists in a specialized court.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has set a minimum guarantee of constitutional
rights, such as that of habeas corpus, to which detainees are entitled.72 However,
the Court has not deemed it unconstitutional for the President to choose which
particular detainees are tried by a military commission and which are tried in an
Article III court.73 As such, when Salim Hamdan, driver and aide to Osama bin
Laden, was convicted by a military commission, the presiding judge made clear
that although Hamdan had access to some exculpatory evidence,74 ordinary
constitutional protections were inapplicable and that the prosecutors had a right to
use at least some evidence derived from coercive interrogations.75 Both of these
concessions to the prosecution represented significant deviations from an Article III
proceeding.76
President Obama revived and modified the military commission system
established by the Bush administration,77 citing the long history of use of such
commissions by the United States military and the Defense Department and the

70. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (acknowledging “the possibility that the [due process] standards
[the Supreme Court] ha[s] articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal”).
71. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2255 (holding that the “DTA review procedures are an inadequate
substitute for habeas corpus,” but that the “DTA and CSRT process remain intact”).
72. See id. at 2240 (holding that procedures established by Congress to review a detainee’s status
were inadequate as a substitute for habeas corpus); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525 (“All agree that, absent
suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United
States”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) (holding that aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay are
entitled to habeas corpus).
73. The courts martial system provides more protection than the military commissions proposed
immediately after September 11, 2001; although the current GTMO detainees don’t qualify for POW
status, a court martial system based on Uniform Code of Military Justice is certainly an option available
to the Obama administration. Such a system would offer the time-tested structural protections that have
not been available in the previous post-September 11 review systems, including the use of experienced
military judges, the availability of neutral appellate review, a system to deal with classified or sensitive
government information, and a set of procedures that has been honed over decades. Neal Katyal, Sins of
Commission: Why Aren’t We Using the Courts-Martial System at Guantanamo?, SLATE.COM (Sept. 8,
2004, 11:11AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2106406/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (noting that “it is
patently absurd to think that our courts-martial system could not handle classified information. It already
does so, day in and day out. We have had courts martial in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Courts martial
are already tooled up to handle evidence seized on a battlefield”).
74. William Glaberson, Terror Trial Nears End As Defense Rests Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008,
at A9 (reporting that Hamdan was able to offer exculpatory evidence, including statements from alQaeda leader Khalid Shaikh Mohamed suggesting that Hamdan was not a leader in the organization).
75. Markon, supra note 63.
76. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 948r(d) (Supp. 2008)).
77. The decision to reinstate military commissions represented a significant shift in the principles
expressed by then-Senator Obama in 2007, when he argued that “[o]ur Constitution and our Uniform
Code of Military Justice provide a framework for dealing with the terrorists.” Editorial, Obama’s
Military Tribunal, WALL ST. JOURNAL, May 18, 2009, at A13. See also David E. Sanger, Obama After
Bush: Leading by Second Thought, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A3 (discussing President Obama’s
changed perspective on this issue).
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need to use military commissions in the interest of national security.78 President
Obama assured the public that the imperative of national security and the need to
adhere to the rule of law could co-exist, and that his administration would
reconstitute the military commissions system in a way that would abide by both
principles.79
In the name of adherence to the rule of law, the Obama administration
amended some of the procedures under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to
add protections for defendants. Evidence from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading interrogations was disallowed, the use of hearsay was limited,80 with the
government bearing the burden of showing the reliability of the hearsay evidence
prior to admission,81 defendants were granted greater latitude in selecting their
counsel, and protections against self-incrimination were instituted for defendants
who chose not to testify.
The Obama administration also attempted to create some transparency in the
process of determining whether detainees would be tried in Article III courts,
78. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of President Barack
Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-Military-Commissions/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
79. See Obama’s Remarks on Military Commissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/politics/15obama.text.html?_r=1 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
80. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (Supp. 2008). The Act provides:
No statement obtained by the use of torture or by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
(as defined by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 2000dd)),
whether or not under color of law, shall be admissible in a military commission under this
chapter, except against a person accused of torture or such treatment as evidence that the
statement was made.
But see § 949(a)(b)(3)(B) (“A statement of the accused that is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded from
trial by military commission on grounds of alleged coercion or compulsory self-incrimination so long as the
evidence complies with the provisions of section 948r of this title”); Marc Thiessen, Holder’s Terror Trial
Catastrophe, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/10/11/AR2010101102834.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“But if the Obama administration insists on
prosecuting Ghailani, there is a forum where the key witness against him would almost certainly be permitted to
testify: a military commission at Guantanamo Bay”). Section 949(a)(b)(3)(D) provides:
Hearsay evidence that would not ordinarily be admissible in a general courts-martial may
be admitted if the adverse party is given adequate notice of intent and the military judge
determines that (1) statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (2) is probative on
the point on which it is offered, (3) that direct testimony not available as practical matter,
and (4) general interests of the rules of evidence and interests of justice are best served.
81. The Bush administration’s attempts—continued by the Obama administration—to have hearsay
evidence be treated as presumptively reliable in the context of the detention of terrorist suspects were
met with skepticism by Article III courts. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34 (noting that hearsay “may
need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government . . . . [T]he
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as
that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided”); Parhat v.
Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (the court did “not suggest that hearsay evidence is never
reliable—only that it must be presented in the form, or with sufficient additional information, that
permits [the finder of fact] to assess its reliability”); Al-Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5
(D.D.C. 2009) (“The Court is fully capable of considering whether a piece of evidence . . . is reliable,
and it shall make such determinations in the context of the evidence and arguments presented during the
Merits Hearing—including any arguments the parties have made concerning the unreliability of hearsay
evidence”); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting a presumption of
accuracy for the Government’s evidence).
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before a military commission, or detained indefinitely pursuant to executive
decree.82 In its July 2009 protocol governing the determination of detainee
placement, the administration noted that detainees are entitled to the presumption
of trial in an Article III court, but then delineated numerous objective and
subjective factors that could warrant a change in venue, including strength of
interest, efficiency, and “other prosecution considerations” such as the available
sentence and the ability to use certain evidence in a given forum.83 As of this
writing, no detainee has been tried under the reconstituted military commission
model, although several detainees have been referred to that system for trial.84
E. Criticisms of the Military Commission Model
The United States’ criminal justice system has been refined for more than two
centuries in an attempt to find a balance between security and punishment on the
one hand, and fairness and adherence to the rule of law on the other.85 The courts
martial system codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice has, likewise, been
developed and changed over many years to find a balance between the individual
rights of the defendant and the need for prosecutorial efficiency in the context of
violations of the laws of armed conflict.86
Although each of these systems is vulnerable to the critique that they do not
strike an appropriate balance between security and liberty interests,87 each system
reflects a strong commitment to equal protection and the rule of law for those
defendants within that system’s jurisdiction. All civilians should expect the
procedural protections of an Article III court when tried for a federal crime. All
lawful combatants can expect the protections of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice when tried in a courts martial proceeding. This commitment to the equal
application of the law—regardless of nationality, religion, the nature of the crime
being charge or the public fear of the defendant—reinforces rule of law norms and
the reputation of the United States’ justice system for impartiality.
The military commission model cannot reinforce rule of law norms, despite

82. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROTOCOL, DETERMINATION OF
GUANTANAMO CASES REFERRED FOR PROSECUTION (July 20, 2009).
83. See id. at ¶ 2.
84. See Charlie Savage, Judge Delays Resumption of Guantanamo Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/15gitmo.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010); Charlie
Savage, Cole Attack Trial Will Test Tribunal System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at A16.
85. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 49, at 25 (discussing the need “to balance the defendant’s
right to a fair trial with the need to protect sensitive evidence that could endanger national security if
disclosed”).
86. See UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, §§ 830, 831(2008) (enumerating pre-trial and post-trial
procedure); but cf. Edward T. Pound, Unequal Justice: Military Courts are Stacked to Convict—But
Not the Brass. The Pentagon Insists Everything’s Just Fine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (December
8, 2002), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/021216/16justice.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2010) (finding that “[t]he system heavily favors prosecutors,” and for a one-year period ending in
September of 2001 of the 7,603 members court-martialed, 7,373 were convicted).
87. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 8, at 333 (critiquing the United States approach to criminal justice
based on the scope of the prison complex, prison conditions, harsh treatment of juveniles, attacks on
judicial authority, and undermining the role of defense counsel).
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assertions to the contrary by the Obama administration.88 It is unclear whether,
even with the changes made in 2009, the military commission system can
guarantee substantive due process, given the fact that defendants are accorded
significantly fewer rights than those facing courts martial proceedings.89 The
Military Commissions Act of 200990 explicitly carves out rights that defendants are
afforded in federal courts or in a courts martial, but are not to be granted to
defendants in military commissions.91 For example, defendants are not guaranteed
the right to remain silent or the right to the exclusion of their previous coerced
statements.92 Defendants are guaranteed neither a speedy trial nor the right to the
exclusion of evidence that was obtained without authorization.93 Trial for ex post
facto crimes is permissible in a military commission.94 Guilty verdicts in noncapital cases can be rendered by two-thirds of the jury;95 in some instances the jury
can be comprised of nine jurors,96 meaning that only six votes are necessary for
conviction. Hearsay evidence is more easily admissible and access to classified
information is significantly curtailed.97 The problematic curtailing of these due
process protections is further compounded by the Obama administration’s
reservation of the right to continue to imprison anyone acquitted under the military
commission system if security interests suggest that continued detention is
necessary.98
88. See Testimony of Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Defense, Before the Senate Armed
Servs. Comm. (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter Johnson Testimony].
89. Such structural unfairness in the military commissions convened since 2001 prompted several
military commission prosecutors to resign in protest. See Josh Meyer, Guantanamo Prosecutor Who
Quit Had ‘Grave Misgivings’ About Fairness, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/12/nation/na-gitmo12 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
90. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009) (codified at 10
U.S.C. §948(a) et seq.)
91. Military Commissions Act § 948b(d).
92. Compare Military Commissions Act § 949a(b)(2)(c) with UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE,
art. 31, §§ (a), (b), & (d) (guaranteeing freedom from self-incrimination, and which are specifically
made inapplicable to military commissions) and U.S. CONST., amend. V (guaranteeing freedom from
self-incrimination).
93. Military Commissions Act § 949a. A speedy trial is guaranteed in both Article III courts and
courts martial. U.S. CONST., amend. VI (giving the right to a speedy trial); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(2)
(2008) (mandating commencement of trials within seventy days of indictment or original appearance in
court). UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 10. Likewise, protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is guaranteed in other trials. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; cf. United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (limiting Fourth Amendment protections regarding alien property
on foreign soil); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 176-77 (2d
Cir. 2008) (limiting warrant requirement for searches conducted by U.S. agents on foreign soil).
94. Military Commissions Act §§ 948d, 950p. Cf. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (“No…ex post
facto law shall be passed.”).
95. Military Commissions Act § 949m. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (requiring unanimous jury verdicts
for conviction).
96. Military Commissions Act § 949m.
97. Military Commissions Act §§ 949a(b)(3)(D), 949p-1-p-7.
98. Jess Bravin, Detainees, Even if Acquitted, Might Not Go Free, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124699680303307309.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). There is also
some danger that the military commission system will serve as a model to try other groups of detainees
designated as non-state actors by the United States and captured as a part of the ongoing battle against
al-Qaeda or any other group deemed to have provided support for al-Qaeda. Editorial, Photographs and
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F. Perceived Targeting of Minority Populations
The structural inequities in the military commission system and the ability of
the administration to pick and choose the venue in which it will try defendants
leads to the appearance and perception that the United States believes one system
of justice is appropriate for its citizens,99 and a lesser level of protection is, as a
policy matter, appropriate for noncitizens who are potentially dangerous.100 The
military commission system resuscitated by President Obama may comply with
United States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions.101 However, possible
compliance with relatively flexible international norms102 does not ensure that the
Kangaroo Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at WK11 (noting that although military tribunals are not
new to American and international military justice “[t]he problem is that these tribunals, unlike
traditional ones, did not just cover prisoners captured on the battlefield. They covered anyone whom
[President] Bush declared beyond the reach of law with the preposterous claim that the whole world is
now a field of battle”).
99. Deputy Solicitor General Neal Katyal, prior to taking on his current post within the Obama
administration, commented on this disparity as follows:
These trials are not ‘equal justice’: For the first time since equality was written into our
Constitution, America has created one criminal trial for ‘us’ and one for ‘them.’ The rules
for the Guantanamo trials apply only to foreigners—the millions of green-card holders
and five billion people on the globe who are not American citizens. An American citizen,
even one who commits the most horrible and treasonous act (such as the detonation of a
weapon of mass destruction), gets the Cadillac version of justice—a criminal trial in
federal court. Meanwhile, a green-card holder alleged to have committed a far less
egregious offense gets the beat-up Chevy: a military commission at Guantanamo. Before
that commission, that noncitizen will have few of the very rights America has
championed abroad, and he can be sentenced to death.
Neal Katyal, On the Ground at Guantanamo: While the Supreme Court Ponders, A Real Trial Begins,
SLATE.COM (Dec. 4, 2007, 6:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2179173/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
Some commentators have framed the “us” and “them” dichotomy in religious terms, noting the tendency
for public discourse to equate being Muslim to being a terrorist. See Glenn Greenwald, What if the
Uighurs Were Christian Rather Than Muslim?, SALON.COM, (July 6, 2009, 8:07 EST),
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/07/06/uighurs/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
100. This distinction based on citizenship has been criticized at times by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that a racially neutral law, if enforced in a
prejudicial manner against non-citizens, contravenes the equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution). See also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 12 (The New Press ed., 2003) (addressing how aliens are often
seen as a first target of national security law and policy in times of emergency). Yet case law suggests
that United States courts are comfortable with the citizenship distinction in national security contexts.
See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming constitutionality of
government decision to treat aliens differently for purposes of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act)
(citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)).
101. Morris Davis, Justice and Guantanamo Bay, THE WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Nov. 10, 2009, 8:51
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704402404574525581723576284.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010). But see Brief of Amici Curiae International Human Rights Organizations Center
for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch, and International Federation for Human Rights in
Support of Petitioner-Appellant, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL
53982, at *13 (Jan. 6, 2006) (arguing that “[b]oth the detention and military commission systems
established by the Executive to indefinitely imprison certain individuals and to try others being held as
enemy combatants at Guantánamo violate the protections afforded military detainees by customary
international humanitarian law, independent of protections under humanitarian law treaties”).
102. See Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 3, §1(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (prohibiting “the
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
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military commissions will be perceived as legitimate, particularly by those
populations from which the defendant class is drawn.103
The perception that the United States accords certain groups of defendants
second-class due process protections engenders extremism and provides a
recruiting tool for terrorist organizations.104 The extensive racial and ethnic
profiling of Muslim men as part of the United States’ post-September 11
counterterrorism activities yielded limited amounts of relevant information,105 but
created the perception that racial and ethnic bias and animus were an inherent part
of the government’s counterterrorism efforts.106
These measures, taken to promote national security in times of emergency,
may assuage the fears of the majority of United States citizens, but serve to alienate
and polarize the targeted minority populations both domestically and abroad.107
Further fueling the distrust from targeted minority populations is the backdrop of
the United States’ national security policy, which has, at times, used a racialized
frame as justification for undermining the rule of law and doing away with basic
equal protection guarantees. The lessons of the Japanese-American internment
during World War II are particularly germane.108 During the internment, over
120,000 people of Japanese descent—most of them United States citizens—were
forcibly displaced for years and had their property sold based on unfounded
national security fears.109 Premised largely on their status as a racial minority and
regularly constituted court, [and] affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples”). It is arguable whether the Obama military commission system
even satisfies the relatively weak protections offered under Common Article 4 of the Geneva
Conventions, since it is unclear whether the military commissions would be considered “regularly
constituted courts” since their existence is separate and distinct from both Article III regularly
constituted courts and courts-martial constituted under the rubric of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
103. See Davis, supra note 101 (arguing that the Obama administration should choose one legally
acceptable venue for the trial of all terrorism suspects, and that, “[d]ouble standards don’t play well in
Peoria. They won’t play well in Peshawar or Palembang either. We need to work to change the negative
perceptions that exist about Guantanamo and our commitment to the law. Formally establishing a legal
double standard will only reinforce them”).
104. Tyler, supra note 48, at 3; Nancy A. Youssef, Did ‘Returning’ Terrorists Become Extremists in
Guantanamo?, MCCLATCHEY NEWSPAPERS (May 26, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
homepage/story/68872.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (implying how years of detention at
Guantanamo may have encouraged ex-detainees to turn to extremist groups to seek revenge for their
unwarranted captivity). See also ANDREW BLICK, TUFYAL CHOUDHURY AND STUART WEIR, THE
RULES OF THE GAME: TERRORISM, COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, in UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, A
REPORT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX 11 (2005).
105. Jim McGee, Ex-FBI Officials Criticize Tactics on Terrorism; Detention of Suspects not
Effective, They Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1.
106. See Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 1073, 1082 (2005).
107. BLICK, CHOUDHURY AND WEIR, supra note 104, at 11.
108. See Gott, supra note 106, at 1081-82 (describing Korematsu as an example of destructive
behavior by the Supreme Court in legitimizing a racialized panic that had taken over American society
and the political branches of government).
109. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 67 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (President Roosevelt’s order
allowing for the internment of Japanese and Japanese-American people due to national security
concerns). See generally JOAN Z. BERNSTEIN, ET AL., PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (1982).
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the perception of Japanese people as an “other” in American society, this
displacement and internment was validated by Congress and the Supreme Court.110
The treatment of Muslims in the United States since September 11 does not
parallel the treatment of Japanese Americans in scope or scale. However, the
perception among the defendants, all foreign nationals and all Muslim, is that
certain national security measures, arguably including specialized terrorism courts,
apply only to them. This policy serves to further undermine the rule of law because
it engenders the belief that the equal application of the law does not reach
defendants like them. As such, beyond even the deontological question of whether
differential treatment is ever appropriate under such circumstances, the question of
whether to use specialized terrorism courts must encompass both the perceived
benefits from a national security perspective, as well as a possible detriment in
terms of equal protection, liberty interests, and the rule of law. These negative
ramifications may ultimately undermine the long-term national security interests of
the United States.
III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SPECIALIZED TERRORISM TRIALS
Analyzing the history and use of specialized courts for trials of terrorism and
related acts contextualizes the domestic debate in the United States over due
process, national security, the rule of law, and individual rights. It is clear that the
history, culture, national security landscape, and constitutional constraints in the
United Kingdom, Israel, and India are all significantly different than that of the
United States. However, in some respects it is precisely these differences that
enhance the utility of comparative analysis because each of these nations, like the
United States, has used specialized terrorism courts or trials at some point to
attempt to deal with national security threats. Taking a closer look at these
experiments with specialized trials, and the trade-offs that each government has
made in terms of the rule of law and national security, offers some guidance as to
the tensions that must be navigated in the United States as the country continues to
experiment with the use of military commissions for the trial of terrorist acts.
A. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has confronted significant internal and external threats to
national security for many decades. The development of the United Kingdom’s
modern national security regime was largely determined by the government
response to the violent conflicts between Catholic Nationalists and Protestant
Unionists known as “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland,111 which escalated in the
early 1970s112 and were largely resolved in 1998 with the signing of the Belfast

110. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (holding that the decision of President
Roosevelt to intern Japanese Americans during World War II was consistent with the President’s war
powers).
111. For a general discussion of the history of the Troubles, see Conflict and Politics in Northern
Ireland (1968 to the present), CAIN WEB SERVICE, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
112. Peter Taylor, LOYALISTS: WAR AND PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 59-60 (Bloomsbury 1999).

150

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1

Agreement.113 During The Troubles, almost 3,000 people were killed and over
30,000 were seriously injured.114 More recently, the United Kingdom has
confronted international terrorist threats, including an attack on the London mass
transit system in July 2005 that killed fifty-six people including the attackers, and
injured over 700 others.115
1. Structural Constraints on Counterterrorism Policy-Making
United Kingdom law and policy has vacillated in trying to maintain a balance
among the interests of national security, civil rights and liberties, and the rule of
law. The British Prime Minister is endowed with war-making power as a legacy of
a historical Crown prerogative;116 nevertheless, he or she almost always seeks
authorization of the Parliament to act.117 Additionally, United Kingdom law and
constitutional norms require that emergency powers be exercised in a legal
framework involving the Parliament and the courts,118 which acts as a significant
disincentive to the Prime Minister in making unilateral war-related decisions. 119
The Prime Minister sets the legislative agenda for the House of Commons, and his
or her power is commensurate with his or her ability to exercise discipline over
Members of Parliament from the same party.120
Mandatory involvement of Parliament121 has ensured that executive branch
113. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 751 (1998),
available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Belfast
Agreement].
114. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli
Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1933 (2004).
115. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON
7TH JULY 2005 2 (2006).
116. PAUL BOWERS, PARLIAMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE (2003), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/snia-01218.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
117. Prime Minister Tony Blair attempted to thwart parliamentary efforts to require parliamentary
permission before the Prime Minister could engage in any military actions. See Jenny S. Martinez,
Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480, 2491 (2006), and
Matthew Tempest, Government Kills Short’s War Bill, GUARDIAN (LONDON) (Oct. 21, 2005, 15:24
BST), http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956, 1597883,00.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
118. Martinez, supra note 117, at 2499 (addressing the cooperation among the Prime Minister,
Parliament, and the judicial system in dealing with the ramifications of an emergency situation);
CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES 185-89 (1948).
119. A (FC) & Others (FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] UKHL 71, [12] (noting that
although the Crown had historically used torture without legislative or judicial permission, such powers
were rejected with the move toward parliamentary supremacy in the late-1600s).
120. Martinez, supra note 117, at 2489; Richard Hefferman & Paul Webb, The British Prime
Minister: Much More Than “First Among Equals”, in THE PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS 26, 3233 (Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb, eds., 2005).
121. Canada has followed international best practices in establishing an even more powerful
legislative oversight mechanism in order to increase accountability: the creation of a National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians that would have full access to classified national security information.
See Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The Choice Between Smart, Harsh, or
Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2151, 2169-2170 (2006)
(noting that in April, 2005, the Canadian government accepted that such a committee should review the
“ability of departments and agencies engaged in security and intelligence activities to fulfill their
responsibilities,” including identifying “required ongoing improvements to the effectiveness of
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legal policy does not unilaterally determine how national security interests are
going to be balanced with constitutional constraints. Instead, the role of Parliament
has forced the Prime Minister to pass legislation in order to deal with particular
situations in the war on terror.122 For example, in November 2005, then Prime
Minister Tony Blair was unable to pass legislation that would allow the
government to detain terrorism suspects for up to ninety days without being
charged because the House of Commons, led by Blair’s own Labour Party, voted
down the proposed legislation.123
Further, judicial review is available for all national security-related legal
policy, including the treatment of individual detainees, even in times of war.124
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has provided an
additional avenue for recourse since detainees have enjoyed the right to appeal
domestic legislation and judicial decisions to the ECHR since 1966.125 The 2004
decision of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department126 illustrated that
British courts can take a strong stand against national security policies crafted by
Parliament and the Cabinet—in that case, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act, 2001 Part IV—if they deem a law to be disproportionate and discriminatory
under ECHR standards.127
Accountability for national security laws and policies is further supported by
independent reviews by a member of the House of Lords who was granted security
clearance and given a mandate to make independent reports on the operation of the
Terrorism Act, 2000 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005.128
As a result of these structural constraints and the layers of review available,
many counterterrorism laws in the United Kingdom focus on a rule of law
perspective and the need to preserve civil rights and civil liberties for those arrested
pursuant to the criminal law.129 As such, conducting trials for alleged terrorists
Canada’s national security system”) (quoting Press Release, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister &
Minister of Pub. Safety & Emergency Preparedness, Deputy Prime Minister Details Proposed Model for
National Security Committee of Parliamentarians (Apr. 4, 2005), http://circ.jmellon.com/docs/
view.asp?id=789 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010)).
122. Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 1936-39 (discussing Parliament’s central role in developing legal
policy on national security matters).
123. Martinez, supra note 117, at 2499; Ed Johnson, Great Britain: Parliament Rejects Crucial Blair
Antiterrorism Bill, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 10, 2005, at A15.
124. Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 1940-43. See also Roach, supra note 121, at 2163.
125. Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 1943.
126. [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) [7] (appeal taken from Eng.).
127. See generally Alexandra Chirinos, Finding the Balance Between Liberty and Security: The
Lords’ Decision on Britain’s Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 265 (2004). Notably, the
legislation in question had been reviewed and criticized by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human
Rights and the Privy Counselor Review Committee prior to being heard in court. Id. at 267.
128. Roach, supra note 121, at 2171 (noting the need for such a measure to ensure against
“[w]idespread public suspicion about national security activities [which] could eventually compromise
the effectiveness of security activities”).
129. Terence Taylor, United Kingdom, in COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES
188-189 (Alexander Yonah ed., 2002). But see BLICK, CHOUDHURY AND WEIR, supra note 104, at 11
(arguing that British counterterrorism measures—even within the ordinary justice system—have “a
disproportionate effect on the Muslim communities in the UK and so are prejudicing the ability of the
government and security forces to gain the very trust and cooperation from individuals in those
communities that they require to combat terrorism”).
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within the ordinary criminal justice system has usually been in effect, despite the
constraints that this system may place on prosecutors, intelligence personnel, and
police.130
The prioritization of civil rights and individual liberty has not always held true
with regard to the arrest, detention, and prosecution of suspected terrorists in
Northern Ireland. In fact, rule of law considerations have, at times, been
intentionally compromised to further a utilitarian model of counterterrorism and
national security policy.131 Because of the potential tension between adherence to
the rule of law and the desire to maximize utilitarian goals, the evolution of
counterterrorism law and policy in Northern Ireland provides an apt and useful
comparator for the current debate over military commissions in the United States as
they might be applied to domestic terrorist activities.
2. Counterterrorism Law and Policy for Northern Ireland
The structural and political constraints of counterterrorism law and policy in
Northern Ireland are quite distinct from those of England.132 Until the devolution
of legislative power from Westminster to Northern Ireland in 1998,133 emergency
powers were invoked as a utilitarian necessity by the Westminster parliament to
deal with counterterrorism issues in Northern Ireland. The invocation of those
emergency powers and their specific, unique application to the population of
Northern Ireland offer instructive guidance on the costs and benefits of creating a
specialized process for suspected terrorists.
130. Britain’s system of trying suspected terrorists in ordinary criminal courts, although subject to
much criticism, has recently resulted in convictions of criminals plotting to set off explosives during
trans-Atlantic flights. John F. Burns, British Court Convicts Three in Plot to Blow Up Airliners, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/europe/08britain.html?_r=1&hp (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010) (noting that the first trial for these suspects resulted in a hung jury, and that the
judge during the second trial instructed the jury—in accordance with British procedure—that a
conviction could be handed down if a 10-2 majority of the jury voted to do so). Four of the eight
suspects tried were acquitted of all charges. Id. During the first trial in 2008, the three men convicted
of conspiring in the terrorist plot in 2009 were convicted only of conspiracy to commit murder. British
authorities laid some of the responsibility on the fact that the Crown Prosecution Service was unable to
introduce material from British or foreign intelligence agencies, and that British courts do not admit
evidence gathered from domestic wiretaps. See John F. Burns & Elaine Sciolino, No One Convicted of
Terror Plot to Bomb Planes, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 9. 2008 at A1.
131. See Catching Terrorists, supra note 5, Testimony of Tom Parker, at 17 (noting that “until [the
passage of the Terrorism Act, 2000], in the United Kingdom you could not be a terrorist unless you were
Irish, unless you were one of the proscribed organizations…which was very, very tightly defined just to
focus on the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland”).
132. The structure of governance for Northern Ireland has shifted over the decades as the relationship
between Northern Ireland and the central government of the United Kingdom has changed. The
Government of Ireland Act, 1920 established a local parliament in Belfast, Northern Ireland, which
exercised limited powers. See Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11, Geo. 5, c. 67 (Eng.)
(establishing Home Rule in Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland). The Act was suspended in favor of
Direct Rule by Westminster in the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1972, passed after the
outbreak of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland. Although Home Rule was reestablished intermittently
over the ensuing twenty-five years, the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, was officially repealed
through the passage of the Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (Eng.), which established the devolved
Northern Ireland Assembly. Id.
133. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (Eng.).
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The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922134
underpinned most of the emergency and counterterrorism legislation that followed
throughout the twentieth century. Among other provisions, this Act provided for
the internment—detention without charge or guarantee of trial—for any individuals
suspected by the Royal Ulster Constabulary of terrorist activity or non-terrorist
illegal activity.135 However, by the early 1970s this tool of internment was deemed
inadequate to deal with the political violence between the Catholic Nationalists and
Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland. 136
Lord Diplock of the House of Lords was tasked with chairing a commission to
consider modifying legal procedures to strengthen counterterrorism efforts.137 The
resulting commission report, known as the “Diplock Report,” analyzed the political
violence in Northern Ireland and recommended restructuring the criminal justice
system in Northern Ireland in order to combat terrorism more effectively.138 The
Diplock Report recommended, among other things, an increase in detention powers
and the ability to try suspected terrorists before a judge, with no jury involved.139
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973,140 enacted as a response
to the Diplock Report, set up so-called “Diplock Courts,” where certain offenses—
among them, terrorist activities—were tried,141 and by authorizing prolonged
detention without charge or trial.142 Both of these provisions marked serious shifts
away from traditional common law protections of trial by jury and the right to be
charged as soon as practicable. However, the Diplock Report framed the shift in
terms of better adherence to the rule of law and claimed its purpose was to increase
the rights of prisoners in Northern Ireland when compared to the preventive
detention powers authorized by the 1922 legislation.143
This tiered structure of criminal justice for suspected terrorists in Northern
Ireland established in the early 1970s provides fertile ground for comparisons with
the current justifications for the use of military commissions in the United States
and the rule of law and national security tensions that undergird the United States’
domestic debate. Like the British context, the United States formation of military
commissions post-9/11 has been framed as a utilitarian necessity that provides
adequate protections regarding the rule of law, and as an improvement over
previous conditions for prisoners suspected of terrorist acts.144

134. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 5.
135. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) §§ 1, 8.
136. Michael P. O’Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned by the
Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1657, 1666 (2003).
137. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185 [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT].
138. Id.
139. Id. at ¶ 36.
140. Northern Ireland Act (Emergency Provisions), 1973, c. 53 (Eng.).
141. Northern Ireland Act (Emergency Provisions) § 2(1).
142. Northern Ireland Act (Emergency Provisions) §10 (schedule 1).
143. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 137, at ¶ 7(e).
144. President’s Remarks, supra note 2 (“[M]y administration is bringing our [military] commissions
in line with the rule of law . . . no longer permit[ing] the use of evidence—as evidence statements that
have been obtained using cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation methods.”).
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a. Diplock Courts
The justifications for the non-jury Diplock Courts were to deal with “perverse
verdicts” due to the intimidation of jurors145 and to increase the number of
convictions of suspected terrorists while affording some closure to some detainees
who had previously been held under the indefinite detention system.146 The
Diplock Report framed this problem in terms of the United Kingdom’s obligations
under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms to provide a fair criminal trial with the same due process
protections for all defendants.147 The Diplock Report noted the right of the United
Kingdom to derogate from its obligations in times of public emergency, and framed
the situation in Northern Ireland as qualifying as a public emergency given the
level of political violence occurring at that time.148
The authors of the report asserted their desire to comply with the United
Kingdom’s international legal obligations, and recommended that because the
protection of witnesses is an integral part of providing due process under the
European Convention, the use of bench trials with in camera hearings where
necessary would protect witnesses appropriately.149 As an additional measure to
protect witnesses, the Diplock Report recommended the criminalization of
membership in proscribed associations, which would obviate the need for witness
testimony in some cases and allow the prosecutions to proceed based on the
Attorney General’s designations of various organizations as “unlawful” and the use
of police affidavits as evidence of the defendant’s association with such
organizations.150 The Diplock Report emphasized the need for the judicial system
to retain the trust and respect of the people under its jurisdiction. The authors
concluded: “If anything were done which weakened [the trust and respect], it might
take generations to rebuild, for in Northern Ireland memories are very long.”151
The recommendations in the Diplock Report led to the establishment of the
Diplock Courts by the Emergency Procedures Act of 1973. Even after the Belfast
Agreement of 1998 led to the devolution of a significant amount of political control
to Northern Ireland, the use of the Diplock Courts was reaffirmed by the Terrorism
Act, 2000,152 which adopted the procedures and list of scheduled offenses that were
employed under the Emergency Procedures Act of 1973.

145. See DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 137, at ¶ 7(a) (“The main obstacle to dealing effectively with
terrorist crime in the regular courts of justice is intimidation by terrorist organisations of those persons
who would be able to give evidence for the prosecution if they dared”). Cf. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE
TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 10 (1975) [hereinafter GARDINER REPORT] (noting that there was
little evidence of juror intimidation, but that the Diplock Court structure was fair and ought to continue).
146. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 137, at ¶ 7(e).
147. Id. at ¶ 12 (citing European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6
(May 1963), available at http://www.solarnavigator.net/embassies/european_convention_of_
human_rights.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter European Convention]).
148. Id.
149. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 137, at ¶¶ 15-16, 20.
150. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22.
151. Id. at ¶ 13.
152. Terrorism Act (Northern Ireland), 2000, pt. VII & schedule 9 [hereinafter Scheduled Offenses].
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At their height in the 1980s, the Diplock Courts tried over 300 cases a year.153
However, after the ceasefire and the Belfast Agreement in 1998, the Diplock
Courts began to try significantly fewer defendants. Throughout the early 2000s,
such courts were used to try approximately sixty defendants per year.154 In 2007,
the United Kingdom curtailed the use of the Diplock Courts, making some
allowances for the continued use of non-jury trials in limited circumstances.155
The use of Diplock Courts to legitimize the judicial treatment of defendants
was perceived by many as a failure because of the disparate and harsh treatment of
Catholic Nationalists under the regime.156 Fueling this perception was the broad
range of scheduled offenses that would bring a defendant within the jurisdiction of
Diplock Courts. Many of the scheduled offenses involved violence but were not
necessarily terrorism-related, which led many to conclude that the Diplock Courts
were undergoing a “mission creep” that forced Catholic Nationalists accused of
almost any violent criminal activity to be tried in that venue.157
Those who consider the Diplock Courts to be a success argue that without
these specialized courts for terrorism trials the ceasefire in Northern Ireland could
not have been achieved.158 In fact, the continued, albeit limited, use of non-jury
trials after the Belfast Agreement can be viewed as evidence that the British
government continues to value the Diplock Court model and the flexibility that it
offers to judges and prosecutors.159
b. Internment
The Diplock Report recommendation that the 1922 preventive detention
system under which an alleged terrorist could be held without formal charge or
trial—a system known as internment—be used as a counterterrorism measure was
implemented in 1973.160 Although the internment system represented a departure
153. See Northern Ireland Office, Replacement Arrangements for the Diplock Court System, at 4
(2006) [hereinafter Replacement Arrangements].
154. See id.
155. Justice and Security Act (Northern Ireland), 2007, c. 6, §§ 4, 5. All trials would presumptively
be slated for a jury, but could be shifted to a bench trial if the Director of Public Prosecutions believed
that there was a “risk to the administration of justice” in holding a jury trial. See INDEP. MONITORING
COMM’N, SIXTEENTH REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING COMMISSION ¶¶ 5.4, 5.5 (2007)
[hereinafter INDEP. MONITORING COMM’N REPORT] (noting that under the new system, the decision to
use a bench trial would be predicated on the individual facts of a case, not on a list of scheduled offenses
as was the case with the Diplock Courts).
156. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353, 137778 (1996).
157. See id. at 1378.
158. E.g., Replacement Arrangements, supra note 153, at 2.
159. U.K. government officials acknowledge that the current limited use of non-jury trials may be
considered by some to be “too close” to the Diplock Courts model. INDEP. MONITORING COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 155, at ¶ 5.7.
160. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 137, at ¶ 7(e); Northern Ireland Act, 1973, c. 53 (Eng.), §10
(schedule 1). The 1973 Act required that the government present to the Secretary of State a prima facie
case of the alleged terrorist’s involvement in a scheduled offense related to terrorism, as well as an
affirmation of the ongoing danger to the community if the alleged terrorist remained out of state
custody. Northern Ireland Act (Emergency Provisions), 1973, c. 53, § 10 (Eng.) (schedule 1).
However, the evidence presented to the Secretary of State was not made available to the alleged
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from the due process guarantees mandated by the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,161 the United Kingdom derogated from its
obligations based on the purported existence of a public emergency.162
Under the internment system, a suspect could be held indefinitely pending
determination.163 Nonetheless, internment under the Emergency Provisions Act of
1973 arguably set forth a greater protection of civil liberties and individual rights
than the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) established after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush.164
The extraordinary measures of creating an internment program in Northern
Ireland and reshaping the criminal justice system specifically for terrorist suspects
were taken to preserve national security. In hindsight, however, it appears that the
cost of such a program—in terms of both the individual costs to those detained165
and the larger societal cost of fostering distrust and resentment among the targeted
population—may have outweighed the benefits. Subsequent investigations prove
what many believed to be true at the time—that the Catholic population in
Northern Ireland was specifically targeted for arrest and detention under the
emergency legislation.166
Military sources reported that the internment program actually led to

terrorist, nor was there an opportunity for the alleged terrorist to challenge his detention immediately.
See GARDINER REPORT, supra note 145, at 38.
161. European Convention, supra note 147, at art. 6.
162. See, e.g., Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84, 11266/84, 11386/85, 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988) (holding that the detention of suspects for four days and six hours without
access to a judge was unacceptable under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms); see also Ni Aolain, supra note 156, at 1365-66 (noting the repeated derogation of the United
Kingdom from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with regard to
the detention and trial of prisoners in Northern Ireland).
163. GARDINER REPORT, supra note 145, at 39.
164. 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (establishing federal jurisdiction over the United States naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). The CSRT structure, established by the Department of Defense within ten
days of the Rasul decision, contained a mixed bag of protections for detainees. See Paul Wolfowitz,
Deputy Sec., Dep’t of Defense, Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
CSRT Order]. For example, the CSRT Order offered detainees the right to have “personal
representative” at the detention hearing, but unlike the internment procedures under the Emergency
Procedures Act of 1973, the personal representative was not an attorney. Compare id. at 1 with
GARDINER REPORT, supra note 145, at 39 (establishing the right of interned individuals to be
represented by an attorney).
165. The internment program prompted the hunger strike by Catholic Nationalist prisoners in 1981,
which in turn focused international attention and sympathy on the Nationalists. The strike is credited
with the development and influence of Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army.
166. Records of the internments in the early 1970s reflect that of the 1,981 people detained without
charge or trial, 1,874 were Catholic Nationalists, supportive of the independence of Northern Ireland,
and only 107 were Protestant Loyalists, politically aligned with the British government and the Royal
Ulster Constabulary.
See Internment—Summary of Main Events, CAIN WEB SERVICE,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). Although it was known that
Protestant Loyalists had committed various offenses that would have qualified the perpetrators for
internment, they were not arrested and detained under the same pretext or conditions as those Catholic
Nationalists who committed similar acts. See id.
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significant increases in political violence. The separatist Irish Republican Army167
was able to use the selective internment of Catholics as an effective recruiting tool,
and the Catholic Nationalist community in Northern Ireland became less moderate
and more polarized against the Protestant government.168 Furthermore, the
internment program caused political parties in Northern Ireland to refuse to become
involved in negotiations with the British government, thereby allowing the
continued radicalization of the Catholic population in Northern Ireland,169 and
reinforcing the loss of reputation of the British government regarding matters of
justice in the criminal justice system and adherence to the higher principles of the
rule of law.170
The Diplock Report framed its recommendations for the Diplock Courts and
internment as emergency legislation that were needed on a short-term basis to deal
with political violence and insurgency.171 Although the failures of the internment
system led to its relatively fast demise within a few years, the emergency measures
legalizing the Diplock Courts were entrenched through the passage of additional
measures for the next thirty years. Both the Diplock Courts and the internment
system continue to be sources of controversy in Northern Ireland as the United
Kingdom attempts a normalization process to improve security, reestablish the
primacy of the rule of law, and build a positive relationship between the central
government and the people of Northern Ireland.172
B. Israel
Israel has a relatively long history of using specialized courts for terrorism
trials. After the June 1967 Six Day War, the Israel Defense Forces created military

167. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (also known as the “Irish Republican Army,” “IRA,”
and “PIRA”) was a paramilitary organization from the late 1960s through the late 1990s that used
political violence, among other means, to attempt to free Northern Ireland from British control. See
generally Kathryn Gregory, Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (aka PIRA, “the provos,” Oglaigh
na hEireann) (U.K., Separatists), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9240/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
168. O’Connor & Rumann, supra note 136, at 1679 (quoting COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, NO
EMERGENCY, NO EMERGENCY LAW: EMERGENCY LEGISLATION RELATED TO NORTHERN IRELAND—
THE CASE FOR REPEAL 6 (1995)).
169. O’Connor & Rumann, supra note 136, at 1680 (quoting PAUL BEW & GORDON GILLESPI,
NORTHERN IRELAND: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE TROUBLES 1968-1993 37 (1993)).
170. Lord Gardiner, in his 1975 report, stated the following:
Although the quasi-judicial system of [internment determination] hearings and reviews
operates with a scrupulous regard for the principles of justice, and produces just decisions
in the majority of cases, it is not perceived as being just by members of the general
public. Delays, the admission of hearsay evidence, the inability to cross-examine
witnesses and the lowered standard of proof have provided much material for propaganda
on the grounds that this is not ‘British justice’ . . . .
GARDINER REPORT, supra note 145, at 43.
171. Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial By Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and American
Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2007).
172. See INDEP. MONITORING COMM’N REPORT, supra note 155, at 42 (commenting on the rule of
law being fundamental and necessary to a society attempting to combat terrorism effectively).
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courts173 in the occupied Palestinian territories174 of the West Bank and Gaza175 to
try Palestinians suspected of terrorist acts176 against Israel.177 No such parallel
military court system exists for Israeli citizens, who are tried exclusively within the
civil court system for suspected acts of terrorism.178
1. Rules and Procedures
The military justice system in the occupied Palestinian territories has been
structured to mirror the civilian court system in numerous respects, including the
right to habeas corpus, the right of the defendant to be represented by counsel, the
placement of the burden of proof on the prosecution, and the right of appeal.179
However, there are numerous areas for which, as a matter of utilitarian national
security priorities and perceived need to compromise rule of law protections to
satisfy those national security policies, the rules and procedures of the military
court system differ significantly from that of the civilian court system under which
Israeli citizens are tried. These differences can lead to starkly different treatment of
defendants, particularly since the Israeli Defense Forces are vested with the sole
173. Military Proclamation No. 2 Concerning Regulation of Authority and the Judiciary (West Bank)
(1967) set forth the governance for the occupied territories. The Security Provisions Order
(Consolidated Version) (West Bank) (no. 378) (1970) sets forth much of the criminal code for the
occupied territories.
174. Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention recognizes the right of an occupying power to bring
offenders before a military court for the purpose of punishing offenses against the occupying power.
See Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 66, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. The general requirements for
such a military court are that it is properly constituted, non-political, and located within the occupied
territory. Id. Likewise, Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) mandates that all defendants are guaranteed a “fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 14(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ICC). The ICCPR also guarantees, among other
rights, the right to a presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination and the right to an
appeal. See ICC arts. 14(2), 14(3)(g), & 14(5). The scope of the jurisdiction of the military courts has
been interpreted broadly by the Israeli Defense Forces. See Sharon Weill, The Judicial Arm of the
Occupation: The Israeli Military Courts in the Occupied Territories, 89 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS
395, 403-04 (2007).
175. The military court system in Gaza was operational until August 2005, when the Israeli military
completed its withdrawal from Gaza. Although the Israeli military continues to have some involvement
with the operations of Gaza, it no longer administers military courts there. See Kathleen Cavanaugh,
The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 197, 199
(2007).
176. Although the military courts are ostensibly limited to dealing with national security issues, the
jurisdiction of the military courts has, in some instances, expanded such that they have tried Palestinians
for offenses such as tax evasion and unauthorized construction. See id. at 206.
177. See LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA 1 (California 2005); AMOS GUIORA, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTERTERRORISM
333 (Aspen 2007). The rationale for the use of military courts to try Palestinians is that Palestinians
have no sovereign nation and, therefore, have no independent justice system to adjudicate such matters.
See HAJJAR, supra at 2, 27-28. The scope of the courts has shifted over the years as certain powers have
been granted to the Palestinian Authority (or rolled back from the Palestinian Authority). However, the
military courts have consistently been used to try Palestinians suspected of terrorist acts against Israel
since their inception in 1967. Id. at 13-15.
178. GUIORA, supra note 177, at 332 n.55.
179. Id. at 332.
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authority to decide whether a Palestinian suspect is tried before a civilian court or a
military one.180
For example, the civilian justice system requires that defendants be brought
before a judge within twenty-four hours of arrest,181 whereas under the military
court system, a Palestinian detainee may be held for up to eight days before being
brought before a judge.182 Military judges and prosecutors are recommended by
the Israeli Defense Forces’ Military Advocate General and are military personnel
appointed by the military commanders of the West Bank and Gaza, whereas
defense attorneys are almost always civilians.183
Palestinians tried by military courts are interrogated by Israel’s General
Security Services and by the Israel Police under the belief that ordinary police
interrogations are not adequate to deal with the potential national security threats
that are at stake. During this time, the military may deny the suspect the right to
see counsel—or anyone else—for up to thirty-one days.184 A military judge can
extend the time frame for denial of access to counsel up to ninety days if the
military affirms that the interrogation of the suspect is ongoing for that duration of
time.185 Interrogators are allowed to exert some physical force as part of the
interrogation of the suspect.186 Any confessions made to General Security Services

180. See Cavanaugh, supra note 175, at 211. Although the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High
Court of Justice, has a broad scope of judicial review even with regard to military matters, it tends to
exercise a great deal of deference to the judgment of the Israeli Defense Forces, even in the context of
military trials. See, e.g., HCJ 4400/98, Barham v. Jurist Judge Lt. Col. Shefi, P.D. 52 (5) 337 (Isr.) (in
which the High Court of Justice declined to compel military judges to hear live witnesses instead of
basing their decisions on affidavits alone).
181. Israeli Penal Code §9.3.3.
182. Israel Military Order No. 378, Order Concerning Security Provisions. This timeframe has been
changed by military order from time to time. At some points, military personnel were allowed to hold
arrested suspects for eighteen days without access to a judge. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 257.
183. See id. at 253-54 (noting that military judges are required to have reached a certain rank prior to
appointment; a President of a military court must have achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher,
and other judges must have achieved the rank of major or higher). See also GUIORA, supra note 177, at
333 (same).
184. GUIORA, supra note 177, at 333. In the ordinary civil courts in Israel, a suspect has the right to
see counsel immediately after arrest. Id. The duration for which a Palestinian may be held in pretrial
detention without access to counsel has changed numerous times since the inception of the military
court system in 1967. This determination is made via military order and is reviewable by the Israeli
High Court of Justice. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 258 (noting that in April 2002, the Israeli
Defense Forces issued Military Order 1500, which instituted a blanket prohibition against attorneyclient meetings for eighteen days after arrest; a petition was submitted to the High Court of Justice for
review of the Order. This prompted Military Order 1505 in July 2002, which changed the duration of
denial of attorney contact to twelve days).
185. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 257.
186. The authority of the General Security Service to employ certain interrogation techniques was
examined by the Israeli Commission of Inquiry, which undertakes investigations of government actions,
and was convened under the authority of the Commission of Inquiry Statute (1968). The Commission
concluded in 1995 that the General Security Service had the authority to interrogate suspects using some
physical techniques, included harsh shaking, which in one instance led to the death of the detainee;
prolonged detention in stress positions; exposure to extreme temperatures; and covering the detainee’s
head with a vomit-covered hood. See HCJ 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State of
Israel, 53(4) PD 817, ¶¶ 8-13 (1999).
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or the Israeli Police are admissible in the military court.187 The defendant has the
right to an in camera hearing before the military judge to challenge the
admissibility of the confession, although this is not often used by defense
counsel.188
Many fundamental procedural protections remain in the military court system:
the trials are governed by the same Israeli Rules of Criminal Procedure that apply
to civilian courts.189 The rules of evidence are drawn from the Military Justice
Law, which also governs Israeli courts-martial proceedings.190 Defendants are
considered innocent until proven guilty.191 Secret information cannot be submitted
to the court to bolster evidence toward a conviction,192 although secret evidence can
be used to extend the period of pretrial detention and to bring initial charges against
a defendant.193 Both the defendant and the prosecution retain a limited right to
appeal from the military court,194 the appeal to be heard by the Military Court of
Appeals.195
Palestinians also retain the right to challenge military procedures in the civilian
court system via a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of
Justice.196 These matters are justiciable197 so long as they turn on a challenge to
The treatment of Palestinians during interrogation has been criticized harshly by some international
observers. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: ISRAEL’S
INTERROGATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1994) (describing the
interrogation of Palestinians by Israeli security forces as “torture,” and concluding that the use of
evidence from such interrogations compromises the legitimacy of the military court system).
187. GUIORA, supra note 177, at 333.
188. Because an allegation that a confession is coerced often turns on the credibility of defendants
versus that of the military interrogators, there is some perception among defense counsel that a
challenge to the admissibility of a confession will, in most cases, be unsuccessful. See HAJJAR, supra
note 177, at 109.
189. GUIORA, supra note 177, at 333.
190. Military Justice Law 5715-1955, 9 LSI 195, (1954-55) (Isr.). See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at
257.
191. GUIORA, supra note 177, at 335.
192. Id. This protection is akin to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) in the United
States, which sets forth a framework to deal with classified government information in the context of a
prosecution. See Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. App. III. §§ 1-16 (2010)).
193. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 110.
194. For trials of serious crimes, the right of appeal is always guaranteed. For minor crimes,
appellate review is discretionary. See id. at 255. Additionally, the military commander for the region
also has the right to reduce or commute the sentence of a convict of the military court. Id.
195. GUIORA, supra note 177, at 333. Cases may be appealed from the military appeals court to the
Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice as well. See, e.g., HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v.
Israeli Defense Forces Commander in the West Bank, 56(4) PD 861 [2002] (Isr.) (reviewing the military
decision to reassign family members of Palestinians suspected of committing terrorist acts against
Israel).
196. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 57.
197. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002) (noting that any complaint against the executive branch and its
actions is considered justiciable by the Israeli Supreme Court, regardless of the standing of the
complainant). See also Schulhofer, supra note 114, at 1923 (noting that the Israeli Supreme Court
dismantled various doctrinal barriers to judicial review, such as standing and justiciability, in the 1990s).
Schulhofer also notes that Israeli government and military leaders seem to accept the judicial safeguards
that have been put into place to modify the conduct of the administration. Id. at 1931.
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particular acts, and not a challenge to overarching national security or military
policy.198 Although the High Court of Justice tends to be extremely deferential to
the decisions made by the Israeli Defense Forces,199 the High Court of Justice does
occasionally modify the procedures of the military court system to increase the
protections for Palestinians.200 Further, the knowledge that each action taken by
the Israeli military may be taken up in the High Court of Justice in itself provides a
deterrent to overreaching by the military courts or by military officers.201
2. Benefits and Costs Associated with the Israeli Military Court System
From the utilitarian and national security-oriented perspective of the Israeli
military, the specialized court system for terrorism trials is a key element in
maintaining security and order in the West Bank and Gaza.202 Proponents of the
military court model cite the fact that Israel has been in a state of war since 1948
and that national security must, in some respects, be the first imperative of the
Israeli government.
Accordingly, supporters argue that the differentiated
procedures and protections of the military court model are necessary
accommodations made to ensure national security.203
The military has arrested hundreds of thousands of Palestinians since 1967; of
those, some have been released, some have been placed in indefinite administrative
detention, and some have been charged in military courts with crimes against Israel
and/or Israeli citizens. Of those charged, 95 percent have been convicted or have
pled guilty to charges.204 This high conviction rate has been interpreted in two
ways: The Israeli government argues that the military is effectively policing
regions with high crime and high terrorism incidence rates; many Palestinians
argue that the military court system is a vehicle for legal repression.205
Critics of the military court structure raise numerous rule of law concerns that
render the military court model fundamentally unfair and repressive. First, the
military courts have differentiated procedures and diminished protections for
defendants compared to the civilian court system.206 These structural differences
alone have created skepticism as to the legitimacy of the military courts.207
198. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) PD 817, ¶¶
8, 51 [2005] (Isr.), in which the High Court of Justice found that a suit which challenged particular
military air strikes was justiciable because the suit did not implicate political or military policies per se;
the suit did not question the practice of targeted strikes generally, so much as the effect of the specific
military strikes on individual civilians. Id.
199. See, e.g., HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, 57(2) PD
349 [2002] (Isr.).
200. E.g., id. at ¶ 26 (holding that the duration of time for which a Palestinian may be held in
detention without access to a lawyer must be shortened in order to comport with basic due process
principles).
201. Amos Guiora, Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism, A Global Perspective, 7 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 125, 144 (2005) [hereinafter Guiora Global Perspective].
202. HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 3, 4.
203. Id. at 32.
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 5.
207. Id. at 206.
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Second, critics consider the legal foundation for the military courts to be
problematic. Although the military courts comply with domestic law and the edicts
of the Israeli courts, critics question whether the military court system violates
customary international law by sidestepping the protections of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.208 The Israeli government asserts that it is not bound by the rules set
forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention governing hostile occupation,209 but
maintains that it treats Palestinians humanely as a matter of policy.210 In addition
to not perceiving customary international law as barring the use of military courts
for certain sectors of the population, the rationale for the military courts is bolstered
by invocation of the British Defense (Emergency) Regulations, a relic of British
colonial rule in Israel and the Palestinian territories, the applicability of which is
now limited to Palestinians but not Israelis.211
Third, the high conviction rate in military courts, coupled with the fact that
many of the defendants are teenagers and young adults, has created the impression
of inevitable injustice against Palestinian defendants that polarizes the Palestinian
population.212 Even staunch allies of Israel, such as the United States, have noted
that ill treatment of Palestinians within the military court system has created
distrust in the legitimacy of the system.213 This polarization has manifested itself in
the radicalizing of younger Palestinians, many of whom believe they have nothing
to lose by committing violence against Israel.214
Fourth, critics of the military courts argue that the rules and procedures, as
actually implemented, fall far short of ensuring that defendants’ rights are

208. For example, the Fourth Geneva Convention offers certain protections to detainees in a conflict that,
like the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, is non-international in nature. See Fourth Geneva
Convention art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. The Fourth Geneva Convention protects detainees against
differentiated treatment based on religion or faith. Id. at art. 3(1). Detainees are also protected against
violence against their person, as well as humiliating and degrading treatment. Id. at art. 3(1)(a), (c).
209. See Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, in
ISRAEL HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 262 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1971) (explaining the lack of
international law jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza); see also Cavanaugh, supra note 175, at
203-04.
210. See Cavanaugh, supra note 175, at 205. In this respect, the Israeli stance mirrors that of the
George W. Bush administration, which argued that detainees in the so-called “war on terror” were not
entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions, but that the United States, as a matter of policy,
would treat detainees humanely. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002).
211. British Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (Eng.). This regulation was withdrawn by the
British government prior to the transfer of power to the Israeli state, but it is unclear as to whether the
withdrawal was effective with regard to the Palestinian territories. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 60.
212. HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 207.
213. See U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2003 Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices, Israel and the Occupied Territories, app. § 1(e) (Feb. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (citing delays in trials,
lack of travel permission for defense witnesses, lack of adequate language interpretation, coercion of
confessions, and poor arrangements for attorney-client meetings as serious problems that undermine the
efficacy of the Israeli military court system).
214. HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 207. See also Palestinian Teenagers, Hit By Closures and Poverty,
Benefit from UN-Backed Youth Centres, UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Aug. 15, 2007),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23508&Cr=palestin&Cr1= (last visited Oct. 21, 2010)
(noting that many Palestinian teenagers are in need of a constructive way to spend their time given their
chronic anxiety and the feeling of loss of control over their lives that stems from the Israeli occupation).
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adequately protected. A 2007 study of over 800 military court cases concluded that
in the areas of preserving the presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial,
the right to access defense counsel, and numerous other areas, the actual operation
of the Israeli military courts sometimes fails to comply with its own procedures, as
well as under Israel’s international law obligations.215 Some courts outside of
Israel have similarly concluded that military courts struggle with the international
law requirements of impartiality and due process,216 and that, therefore, the rule of
law is almost always compromised when military courts are used to try civilians.217
C. India
India has been coping with serious national security concerns, both internal
and external, for the last sixty years.218 By some accounts, India has faced the
highest number of terrorist acts in recent years of any nation.219 In response to
internal and external threats of terrorism that have been present since Indian
independence, the central government of India220 and the parliament have enacted a
number of statutes that authorize preventive detention221 for terrorism suspects222
and empower the convening of specialized terrorism courts.223
The stated impetus for the creation of specialized terrorism courts is to
expedite the prosecution of alleged terrorists—not a small concern in India, where
the lag time from arraignment to prosecution ranges from many months to several

215. See YESH-DIN VOLUNTEERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BACKYARD PROCEEDINGS: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
164-65 (December 2007).
216. See Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, 29 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 449, ¶¶ 68-73
(1998) (noting that military judges are often unable to act with impartiality toward a defendant within
the context of a military court).
217. See id.; see also Cavanaugh, supra note 175, at 218-219.
218. See Anil Kalhan, et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and Security Laws in
India, 20 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 93, 99 (2006); ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS: INDIA, THE UNITED STATES,
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ISRAEL 1 (K.R. Gupta, ed., Atlantic 2002).
219. E.g., Arun Venugopal, India Worst Hit by Terrorism in 2004, INDIA ABROAD, Aug. 19, 2005 at
A14.
220. The central government of India has the responsibility to develop laws and policies to preserve
the national security of India. INDIA CONST. 7th sched., List I §§ 1-2, 2A, List III §§ 1-2.
221. Under Article 22 of the Indian Constitution, those arrested must be provided the basis for arrest
“as soon as may be” and produced before a magistrate within 24 hours. INDIA CONST. art. 22.
However, Article 22(3) of the Constitution allows the central and state governments to enact preventive
detention laws during non-emergency times and contains a carve-out such that a person arrested or
detained under preventive detention laws need not be brought before a magistrate before 24 hours, nor
does the detainee have the right to counsel or to be informed of grounds for arrest. INDIA CONST. art.
22(3).
222. For example, the Defence of India Act of 1962 authorized the central and state governments to
broaden their use of preventive detention beyond ordinary laws as a means to quell potential uprisings
against the government and in response to hostilities in the Jammu and Kashmir region. See Kalhan,
supra note 218, at 132-33 (citing VENKAT IYER, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 109
(2000)).
223. Statutes are not the only mechanism by which the central government has attempted to deal with
purported national security threats.
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years224—and to create a trial system that offers some due process protections, but
is structured to result in a higher conviction rate than the ordinary court system
would afford. In reality, these specialized courts have resulted in a low conviction
rate225 and often appeared to target political enemies and particular minority
populations within India for harsher treatment in courts that afford them fewer
procedural and substantive protections.226
1. History of Specialized Courts
In 1967, the government enacted the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA)227 that served as a catchall legislation by which terrorist acts, among other
crimes, could be prosecuted. UAPA authorized the central government to set up
tribunals to determine whether particular organizations posed a threat to the safety
of India, and would, therefore, be considered unlawful associations.228 UAPA also
made membership in unlawful associations a prosecutable offense229 and
immunized the government against claims of wrongful conduct, so long as the
government acted in good faith in its execution of UAPA.230 UAPA, however, did
not set up a system of separate courts to deal with prosecutions; instead,
prosecutors utilized the flexibility of the criminalized acts under UAPA to try
suspects within the standard criminal justice system.
In 1985, the government enacted the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA).231 TADA was India’s first nationwide legislation
specifically crafted to address the investigation and prosecution of terrorism.232
224. Jayanth K. Krishnan, India’s “Patriot Act”: POTA and the Impact on Civil Liberties in the
World’s Largest Democracy, 22 LAW & INEQ. J. 265, 280 (2004).
225. Sachin
Mehta,
Repeal
of
POTA
Justified,
LEGAL
SERVICES
INDIA,
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/pota.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (noting that authorities
had achieved only a one-percent conviction rate under the Terrorist and Disruption Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA), despite the fact that TADA granted prosecutors the ability to use a broader
range of evidence than was admissible in the regular criminal justice system).
226. Under TADA, evidence indicated that Muslims were arrested en masse whenever unrest
occurred, whereas violence committed by Hindus went largely unacknowledged. See Krishnan, supra
note 224, at 270-71, 275.
227. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, INDIA CODE (2010), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in (UAPA).
228. UAPA § 5.
229. UAPA §§ 10-14.
230. UAPA § 18.
231. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, Act No. 28 of 1987, INDIA CODE (2010),
amended by Act No. 43 of 1993, available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
232. TADA was preceded by the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, Act No. 61 of 1984,
INDIA CODE. (2010), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. This Act created Special Courts for terrorism
offenses with many of the same definitions, procedures and processes that were embodied in TADA.
See Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, ¶¶ 2 (Definitions), 4 (Establishment of Special
Courts), 5 (Composition and appointment of Judges of Special Courts), 10 (Procedures and powers of
Special Courts), 14 (Appeal). However, the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act applied to all
regions of India except Jammu and Kashmir. See Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, ¶ 1.
Although TADA was initially enacted with the same carve-out for Jammu and Kashmir, it was quickly
amended to apply to all regions of India. See Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, ¶ 8
(India) (noting the deficiencies in India’s counterterrorism programs were highlighted by the 1984
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi).
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The motivation for the law’s passage was the escalating threat of violence in
Punjab and the concern that existing legislation, such as the UAPA, granted
insufficient powers to the government to combat and prosecute terrorism.233 Under
TADA, the government was granted the ability to convene specialized courts
(“Designated Courts”) to try terrorism cases.234
Numerous aspects of the specialized court system significantly undercut rights
afforded to defendants within the regular criminal justice process. For example, on
the question of jurisdiction, the central or state government had the discretion to
decide whether a case was referred to a Designated Court or to the standard
criminal justice system.235 If any question arose as to the appropriateness of
assigning a case to be tried by the Designated Court, the decision would be referred
to the central government, whose decision on the matter was final.236
For crimes that carried a prison sentence of three years or fewer, the
Designated Court judge had the right to abrogate the usual criminal procedural
process and hold an in camera summary trial at his or her discretion.237 Most
drastically, TADA shifted the burden of proof onto defendants for various crimes
including the possession of firearms and the financing of unlawful associations.238
TADA expired in 1995239 amid heavy criticism that the government had misused
the legislation to target racial and religious minorities240 and that it had not
achieved the desired effect of stemming legitimately dangerous activity.241
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks,242 and attacks on Indian
government buildings soon afterward,243 India expanded its antiterrorism laws to
grant additional authority and power to the central government to maintain national
security. The Indian Parliament enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002
(POTA),244 which mirrored TADA provisions in numerous ways. The government,
233. See Krishnan, supra note 224, at 267.
234. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, Act No. 28 of 1987, pt. III, § 9, INDIA
CODE (2010), amended by Act No. 43 of 1993, available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
235. TADA §§ 9(1), (2).
236. TADA § 9(3).
237. TADA § 14(2).
238. TADA § 21.
239. TADA was enacted in 1985 with a two-year sunset provision. However, its duration was
extended by the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Act No. 28 of 1987, INDIA
CODE (2010), amended by Act No. 43 of 1993. The 1987 version of TADA was substantially identical
to the original version from 1985, and was renewed repeatedly until it was allowed to expire in 1995.
See Kalhan, supra note 218, at 100.
240. Repeal of Anti-Democratic Laws Sought, THE HINDU (Aug. 7, 2004),
http://www.hindu.com/2004/08/07/stories/2004080707001100.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
241. See Mehta, supra note 225.
242. An additional impetus for the passage of POTA was United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373, a post-September 11 resolution which required all governments to enact specific antiterrorism legislation. See generally S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
243. The Indian parliament building in New Delhi was attacked in December 2001, with 12 people
killed and 22 injured in an exchange of gunfire. See On This Day 1950-2005, 2001: Suicide Attack on
Indian Parliament, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/
newsid_3695000/3695057.stm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
244. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002, INDIA CODE (2010) (POTA), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in, was enacted March 28, 2002, replacing the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance,
No. 9 of 2001, INDIA CODE (2001), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. Under the Indian Constitution,
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in conducting antiterrorist activities and in case of a self-determined emergency,
was authorized to set aside ordinary legal protections in numerous respects,
including criminalizing association or communication—without any criminal
intent—with terrorist suspects,245 broadening the right to wiretap any person within
India without authorization,246 extending the duration and scope of preventative
detention measures,247 allowing confessions to police officers to be admitted as
substantive evidence,248 and denying arrested suspects access to counsel.249
POTA authorized specialized terrorism courts (“Special Courts”) and set up
specific guidelines for the management of such cases.250 The Special Courts
system mirrored TADA’s limitation of rights for defendants, including the
discretion of the central government or state government to decide whether a case
was referred to a Special Court or to the standard criminal justice system.251
Likewise, the Special Court judge could hold a summary trial at his or her
discretion for offenses carrying a sentence of fewer than three years.252
One notable difference between TADA and POTA was the burden-shifting
provisions in POTA. The right of the Special Court to take judicial notice that the
offense had occurred if so requested by the government253—a feature that
essentially shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant254—
was not limited to only firearms and financing offenses, as they were under TADA.
Under POTA, the burden of proof could be shifted for any offense under the
statute.255 Courts also had the right to proceed with a trial in the absence of the
defendant, so long as the right of the defendant to recall witnesses for later crossexamination was preserved.256 Despite curtailing numerous procedural rights,
POTA, like TADA, preserved the right of appeal to the appropriate state high court
or Indian Supreme Court for defendants convicted in a Special Court.257
Additionally, defendants maintained the right to cross-examine witnesses and to
have limited access to relevant evidence.258
the executive branch has the power to issue ordinances for a short duration to meet unforeseen or urgent
challenges to the nation. INDIAN CONST. art. 123. See M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11112 (1967).
245. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002, §3(5), INDIA CODE (2010), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
246. POTA § 43. The admissibility of evidence garnered in this manner is established in POTA § 45.
247. POTA §§ 48(2), 49.
248. POTA § 32. The admissibility of confessions is a reversal of the pre-POTA rule that
confessions to police officers are generally inadmissible. See Kalhan, supra note 218, at 161.
249. POTA § 52.
250. POTA §§ 23-34.
251. POTA § 23(1). As with TADA, the central government made the final decision on whether a
case was appropriately tried in a Special Court. POTA § 23(3).
252. POTA § 29(2).
253. POTA § 29(1).
254. Sudha Ramachandran, Filling India’s Anti-Terrorism Void, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Sept. 23,
2004), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FI23Df03.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Ramachandran].
255. POTA § 29(1).
256. POTA § 29(5).
257. POTA § 34 ( preserving a right of appeal to a high court, but eliminating the right of direct
appeal through the ordinary judicial processes to attempt to streamline the appeals process).
258. POTA § 29(2), (5).
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POTA was met with a great deal of opposition from human rights advocates
and opposition political parties based on fears of misuse and abuse in its
application.259 In fact, in the years that it was in effect, POTA appeared to be used
selectively to target particular populations.260 Evidence from the state of Gujarat
suggests that arrests under POTA may also have been religiously selective,261 given
that almost all of the 280 arrests were of Muslims.262 In contrast, Hindus who were
arrested for suspected involvement in communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 were
not tried in Special Courts, if they were tried at all.263 Furthermore, critics argued
that the insufficient procedural protections in Special Courts were further weakened
by judges who often erred on the side of the prosecutors under the rationale that
they were acting as a government safeguard against defendants who were likely
terrorist threats.264
POTA became a driving issue in the 2004 parliamentary election.265 After
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s election, he followed up on one of his major
election promises to repeal POTA.266 However, many key provisions of POTA
were immediately incorporated into the UAPA via amendments in order to ensure
that specific antiterrorism legislation remained in effect.267 These amendments also
curtailed the government’s power considerably in declining to authorize specialized
courts to try terrorism suspects and by limiting the government’s ability to shift the
259. C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Implications of National Security Laws in India: Combating
Terrorism While Preserving Civil Liberties, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195, 196 (2005).
260. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003 (EVENTS OF 2002) 241 (2003).
261. Mehta, supra note 225.
262. Ramachandran, supra note 254.
263. In February 2002, communal violence broke out in the context of tension over the location of a
proposed Hindu temple on the site of a mosque that was destroyed in 1992. After at least fifty-eight
Hindu activists were killed in a train fire, the retaliatory violence led to the killings of over two thousand
Muslims. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 260, at 236-37. Most of the investigations of the
retaliatory violence did not result in arrests or trials of suspects. Id. at 238. At the time of this violence,
a temporary Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance—containing virtually the same provisions as POTA,
was in effect. See Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, No. 9 of 2001, INDIA CODE (2010), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
264. See Kalhan, supra note 218, at 165; Testimony of K. Chandru, in THE TERROR OF POTA AND
OTHER SECURITY LEGISLATION: A REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL ON THE PREVENTION OF
TERRORISM ACT AND OTHER SECURITY LEGISLATION 63 (Preeti Verma ed., 2004).
265. COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, INDIA COUNTRY REPORT: ANTI-TERRORISM
LAWS & POLICING, IN STAMPING OUT RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF ANTITERRORISM LAWS ON POLICING 3
(2007), available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2007/docs/
country_reports/071004_chogm07_india_anti_terrorism_policing_country_report2007.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010) (citing Public Statement of Amnesty International, India: Continued detention two years
after the repeal of POTA (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/ASA20/026/2006/en/e7b5cd9f-f9d3-11dd-b1b0-c961f7df9c35/asa200262006en.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Public Statement of Amnesty International]) .
266. Id. See generally, Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, No. 26 of 2004, INDIA CODE (2010),
available at http://indiacode.nic.in. People arrested under POTA continued to be held in detention after
the repeal of POTA and until their status had been determined by the government or they had been
charged and tried for a crime (in a specialized or ordinary court). For some detainees, this determination
period lasted for two years or more beyond the repeal date of POTA. See Public Statement of Amnesty
International, supra note 266.
267. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, No. 29 of 2004, INDIA CODE
(2010), available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
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burden of proof onto defendants.268
Numerous major terrorist attacks occurred after the repeal of POTA, including
the 2006 bombings in Varanasi269 and Mumbai270 that killed at least 215 people
combined, and attacks in Bengaluru,271 Ahmedabad,272 and New Delhi273 in 2008,
that killed over eighty people combined. However, none of those events prompted
new legislation specifically addressing issues of terrorism; instead, the government
sought flexibility within the existing criminal justice system in order to prosecute
the cases more rapidly than ordinary cases.
The impetus for legislative change came after a three-day terrorist attack in
Mumbai in late November 2008, in which 163 people were killed by ten gunmen
who coordinated with trainers in Pakistan to carry out their attack,274 triggering
outrage among the Indian public and a demand for stronger national security and
antiterrorism measures.275 In response, the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the
Indian parliament, rapidly passed two pieces of legislation: the National
Investigation Agency Bill (NIA Bill)276 and further amendments to the UAPA.277
The NIA Bill established a National Investigation Agency to coordinate
national security and counterterrorism operations, but also reinstated the Special
Courts that had been eliminated in the 2004 repeal of POTA.278 All of the
provisions regarding the Special Courts, including those relating to jurisdiction,279
the burden of proof lying with the defendant,280 the right of the Special Court to use
summary trials,281 and the right of the Special Court to proceed without the
268. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance § 45.
269. Serial Blasts in Varanasi, TELEGRAPH (March 7, 2006), http://www.telegraphindia.com/
1060308/asp/frontpage/story_5941755.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
270. Mumbai Death Toll Tops 200, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2006, 16:07 BST),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jul/12/india (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
271. Nirmala Ravindran & Swagata Sen, Terror Strikes Bangalore; 2 Killed, 12 Injured in 9 Blasts,
INDIA TODAY (July 25, 2008, 14:41 IST), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/11966/
LATEST%20HEADLINES/Terror+strikes+Bangalore;+two+killed,+12+injured+in+nine+blasts.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
272. Ahmedabad Blasts: Toll rises to 49, INDIA TODAY (July 27, 2008, 5:18 IST),
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/12030/LATEST%20HEADLINES/Ahmedabad+blasts:+Toll+rise
s+to+49.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
273. Rahul Tripathi, Serial blasts rock Delhi; 30 dead, 90 injured, TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 14, 2008,
12:50 AM IST), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Serial_blasts_rock_Delhi_18_dead/articleshow/
3479914.cms (last visited Oct. 21, 2010); Death toll in Delhi blast rises to three, HINDUSTAN TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2008, 10:56 IST), http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.
aspx?id=4eda9fa6-e2f5-4ea6-bd8e-dff5d4159f26TerrorStrikesDelhi_
Special&&Headline=Death+toll+in+Delhi+blast+rises+to+three (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
274. Somini Sengupta, Dossier Gives Details of Mumbai Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A5.
275. Somini Sengupta and Keith Bradsher, India Faces Reckoning as Terror Toll Eclipses 170, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at A1.
276. National Investigation Agency Bill, Bill No. 75-C of 2008, INDIA CODE (2010), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in (NIA).
277. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, Bill No. 76 of 2008 INDIA CODE (2010),
amending the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, INDIA CODE (2010), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in.
278. NIA, c. II & IV.
279. NIA § 11(1), (2).
280. NIA § 16(1).
281. NIA § 16(2).
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defendant in attendance282 are identical to the language in POTA that Parliament
had rejected four years earlier. In some respects the scope of the current legislation
is broader than POTA since the NIA Bill covers numerous offenses that were not
within the scope of POTA.283
The 2008 amendments to UAPA are even stronger than the NIA Bill with
regard to the powers accorded to the government in investigating and prosecuting
terror-related crimes even in ordinary courts. The 2008 UAPA amendments
broaden the definition of a terrorist act,284 expand the power of police to conduct
search and seizure,285 extend the limits on preventive detention to 180 days without
charge,286 limit or abolish the right to bail in many cases,287 and shift the burden of
proof onto the accused.288
The trial of the Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving gunman from the Mumbai
2008 attack, began in June 2009 in a special court designated for the case,289 and
the speed of the trial was remarkable for the notoriously slow Indian judicial
system.290 Nonetheless, serious due process concerns surfaced with regard to this
trial, such as the fact that defense counsel was allowed only fifteen minutes per day
to meet with Kasab, and that all attorney-client meetings took place in the presence
of police and court officials.291 Both restrictions reflect significant shifts away
from standard procedures in the ordinary criminal justice system.
Critics of the 2008 legislation argue that the bills are a repetition of previous
missteps in TADA and POTA.292 They note that the 2008 UAPA amendments
reflect a convergence of the draconian counterterrorism policies of TADA and
POTA with ordinary criminal procedure, creating a framework by which innocent
citizens could be arrested, held in preventive detention, tried in a nonpublic Special
282. NIA § 16(5). In a regular criminal proceeding, the accused is protected by Section 273 of the
Criminal Procedural Code, which requires evidence to be taken by a court only when the accused is
present.
283. B.B. Pande, Anti-Terror Legislation, SSRN.COM (Aug. 20, 2009), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1458279 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
284. UAPA 2008 Amendments §§ 15-18.
285. UAPA 2008 Amendments § 12.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Rama Lakshmi, In Mumbai Terrorism Case, An Emotional, Historic Trial, WASH. POST (June
22, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/21/AR2009062101731.
html?sub=AR (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (describing the start of the trial of suspect Ajmar Amir Kasab
in a special court in which the pace of the trial is significantly faster than that of ordinary courts).
290. Vaishnavi Chandrashekhar, Beyond Kasab Guilty Verdict, Mumbai Attacks Reshape Indian law,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 3, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0503/BeyondKasab-guilty-verdict-Mumbai-attacks-reshape-Indian-law (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (discussing the
relatively speedy conclusion of the Kasab trial and the larger ramifications for Indian counterterrorism
law and policy); Vikas Bajaj & Lydia Polgreen, Suspect Stirs Mumbai Court by Confessing, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 07/21/world/asia/21india.html?_r=1&hp (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010) (noting that 134 witnesses had testified in the trial of Ajmal Kasab during the first several
weeks).
291. Chandrashekhar, supra note 290.
292. Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, HUMAN RIGHTS FEATURES (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF191.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Repeating
the Mistakes of the Past].
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Court and be convicted solely because they were unable to overcome a
presumption of guilt.293 Critics also object to the lack of external checks and
oversight on the implementation of the legislation: TADA and POTA both
contained sunset provisions, whereas the 2008 UAPA amendments do not.
Further, the 2008 UAPA amendments do not require any meaningful judicial
scrutiny of the prosecutor and the central government’s decision as to whether
detainees will be prosecuted within the ordinary court system or in a Special
Court.294
2. Legal Treatment of Specialized Terrorism Courts
The use of these Special Courts has been upheld, with some reservations, by
the Indian Supreme Court.
In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,295 the
constitutionality of TADA and similar legislation was addressed by the court.296
Specifically, the court undertook a review of the legality of Special Courts and their
procedures as articulated under TADA.297 The petitioner’s challenge to the
Designated Court/Special Court system was based on Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution,298 which guarantees due process,299 and the Indian Supreme Court’s
decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,300 which interpreted Article 21 as
establishing a guarantee of substantive due process.301
The court first noted that the purpose of TADA and other similar legislation
was to expedite the trial process in instances where national security concerns are
implicated.302 It lauded this goal, noting that the right to a speedy trial was
fundamental in limiting pretrial detention, protecting a defendant’s right to defend
himself, and fulfilling societal interests in the resolution of a case.303
With regard to the specialized procedures and burden-shifting in favor of the
prosecution, the court upheld the constitutionality of TADA based on the limited
application of the laws to suspected acts of terrorism, as well as the dire national
security situation and the corresponding need for flexibility within the criminal
justice system.304 The court took note of the fact—seemingly with approval—that
the provisions of TADA in question mirrored those of the Northern Ireland
Emergency Provision Act of 1978, used as part of the counterterrorism effort

293. Id.; Pande, supra note 283.
294. Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, supra note 292.
295. (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, ¶ 289 (India).
296. Kartar Singh, at ¶ 2.
297. Id. at ¶ 35.
298. Article 21 reads: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.” INDIAN CONST. art. 21.
299. Kartar Singh, at ¶¶ 80-81 (noting that petitioner’s argument was that the Special Courts did not
afford a fair trial based on the streamlining of procedures, the compromise of judicial independence and
the presumption of guilt of the defendant).
300. (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (India).
301. Id. See Kartar Singh, at ¶ 81.
302. Kartar Singh, at ¶ 82.
303. Id. at ¶ 85. In doing so, the Court noted the protections of the Magna Carta, the Sixth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the 1974 Speedy Trial Act. Id. at ¶ 84.
304. Id. at ¶¶ 219-223.
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during the Troubles.305 The court rejected a substantive due process argument as
well, noting, like many United States’ courts, that the judiciary did not have the
right to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature with regard to the
appropriate measures to take combating national security threats.306
Although their constitutionality may not be at issue after the Kartar Singh
decision, it remains unclear whether the new Special Courts under the NIA Bill can
avoid the pitfalls that plagued previous iterations of the specialized terrorism
courts, namely a low conviction rate, selective prosecution of particular ethnic and
religious groups and a concern for serious human rights abuses. Given that the
current legislation is broader and further reaching than POTA, yet has been
stripped of some of POTA’s oversight of the police and prosecutors, it may be even
more difficult for future Special Courts to deliver both justice and national security
effectively.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM WITHIN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
The current iteration of the military commission system in the United States
shares many traits with specialized courts in the nations examined above. Like the
United Kingdom and India, the genesis of the current United States military
commissions stems from a perceived national emergency for which the traditional
justice system is believed to be inadequate or inappropriate.307 Whereas the
construction of the criminal justice system is a delicate balance among the interests
of security, individual rights, and the rule of law, the specialized courts jettison
some fundamental protections for defendants in a manner meant to increase the
conviction rate in the hopes of improving national security, at least in the shortterm.308 The specialized court systems in Northern Ireland, India, and the United
States also suffer from a seemingly subjective and easily manipulable set of criteria
to determine whether a defendant enjoys the rights of an ordinary criminal trial or
is moved into the specialized court system.
Like Israel, the United States predicated and justified its decision to use a
305. Id. at ¶ 224.
306. Id. at ¶¶ 229-232 (holding that TADA and the other statutes at issue did not contravene the
protections against arbitrariness embodied in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution). The court also
noted that even though TADA allows for a detainee to appeal the denial of bail to the courts under
limited circumstances, courts should be wary of exercising the power to accept such appeals. Id. at ¶
368(17).
307. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). In this military order, President George
W. Bush justified the use of military commission as follows:
Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism . . . it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts . . . . Having fully considered the magnitude of
the potential deaths, injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential
acts of terrorism against the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I
have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense purposes,
that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that
issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.
66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34.
308. See id.
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military commission system instead of ordinary courts based partly on its
assessment of international law. Israel’s decision to use military courts to try
Palestinians for crimes against Israel and Israeli citizens is arguably sound given
the fact that it is an occupying force in Palestinian territory.309 Likewise, the
United States’ decision to use a military commission system is based partly on its
interpretation of international legal protections that attach to various types of
combatants, and its determination that the detainees in the “war on terror” do not
warrant legal treatment as lawful combatants.310 However, the international legal
status of the detainees or the decision to use a military commission clearly does not
determine what types of procedural and substantive protections are implemented in
a military commission. Yet in both the Israeli and United States contexts, the
governments made conscious decisions to offer a lower level of protections to
defendants than that offered in ordinary criminal courts, or to citizens of the nation
in question who have been accused of similar crimes.
In Northern Ireland, Israel, India, and the United States, the use of specialized
courts for terrorism trials is either largely or exclusively confined to a particular
group of individuals whom the government (and perhaps the majority population of
the nation) believes to be a national security threat. In Northern Ireland, it was
overwhelmingly the Catholic Nationalists who were interned by the executive or
tried in the Diplock Courts. In Israel, only Palestinians are subject to trial by
military courts. In India, it is largely Muslims who are slated for trial in the
Designated Courts. In the United States, defendants have historically been tried for
terrorism in ordinary Article III courts; yet under the framework of the so-called
“war on terror” and the current military commissions, only foreign Muslim men are
slated for trial in military commissions.
A clear deontological argument can be made that specialized courts should not
be used: The very fact that the United States chooses to use a specialized trial
system for certain suspects, all of whom happen to be non-U.S. citizens who are
Muslim men, raises or ought to raise moral red flags that counsel toward abolishing
a specialized and segregated system. Although this argument has been voiced
repeatedly since 2001,311 it has not gained traction in policy-making circles,
particularly given the rhetoric surrounding the potential threat to the American
public should suspects be afforded the same types of protections available to either
civilians or designated lawful combatants.312 Furthermore, there is little legal
argument to be made that the disparate impact on Muslims of the government
policy of trying some terrorism defendants in military commission qualifies as an

309. See HAJJAR, supra note 177, at 2, 27.
310. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833.
311. E.g., Gott, supra note 106. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Internments, Then and Now: Constitutional
Accountability in Post 9/11 America, 2 Duke F. L. & Soc. Change 71, 89 (2010); Natsu Taylor Saito,
For “Our” Security: Who is an “American” and What is Protected By Enhanced Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUS. 23, 29-31 (2004) (citing the difference in judicial
treatment of Lindh and McVeigh versus Hamdi and Padilla as evidence of disparate treatment of Middle
Eastern men).
312. E.g., Politicians Rip Decision on Terrorism Trials, CNN.COM (Nov. 13, 2009, 5:06 PM EST),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-11-13/politics/mohammed.critics_1_terrorists-civilian-court-militarytrial?_s=PM:POLITICS (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
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equal protection violation.313 Yet the lack of a constitutional violation does not
translate into the perception of impartiality in Muslim communities, either in the
United States or internationally.314
It is this perceived lack of impartiality among the targeted communities in
Northern Ireland, Israel, India, and the United States that has contributed greatly to
the alienation of members of these communities, undermining their sense of loyalty
and inclusion in larger society, and often going so far as to radicalize them against
the governments of these nations.315 In all of the countries examined here, the
question of whether to use a specialized terrorism trial process is not a matter of
legality under the nation’s constitution or, at least arguably, under international
law. Policymakers have made clear that they do not view the specialized trial
system to be a significant moral issue that counsels toward ordinary courts or the
military justice system afforded to lawful combatants. Rather, the question in each
nation turns on utilitarianism, national security, individual rights, and the rule of
law. All of the factors, which differentiate the treatment of those defendants slated
for trial in a specialized court, contribute to the shift away from an adherence to the
rule of law and equal protection of the law and gravitate towards a model where
national security concerns are given primacy, regardless of the moral cost or
whether a utilitarian benefit can be proven as to short-term or long-term national
security gains.
V. CONCLUSION
In continuing to use specialized courts to try terrorism suspects, the United
States remains in the ranks of the nations surveyed in this Article. Like the United
Kingdom, Israel, and India, the United States’ policy appears to prioritize national
313. The standard for proving a selective prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is
extremely high. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996). Based on the standard in
Armstrong, in order prove an equal protection violation based on selective prosecution of Muslims in a
military commission, the plaintiff would have to prove intent to discriminate based on a protected
category, such as religion, and also prove that similarly situated non-Muslims have been treated by the
government in a different manner. Id. This is often a difficult, if not impossible, standard to fulfill.
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
314. See OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPERT MEETING ON SECURITY,
RADICALIZATION, AND THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ¶ 28 (July 28, 2008), available at
www.osce.org/item/34235.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (“Expert Meeting on Security”) (finding
that of the twenty-five countries listed in the United States security entry/exit registry, all but one, North
Korea, were predominantly Muslim).
315. See id. (stating that “the mere perception of profiling may be sufficient to foster mistrust of
authorities and result in alienation of communities”). Researchers from the United Kingdom have
argued that seemingly separatist counterterrorism treatment—even those measures falling well short of a
specialized trial system—can have negative effects within the targeted community that are detrimental
to the long-term security of a nation. See also Blick, supra note 104, at 11:
[Although there are] comparatively few terrorists in the midst of [British Muslim]
communities . . . [there are] larger numbers of people who have some sympathy with
their aims, and who share to some extent the frustrations and anger that drives the men of
violence and who could give them the tacit or active support on which terrorists
everywhere rely. Government policy must persuade these young people that their future
lies within the democratic framework of a tolerant and law-abiding nation. These shortterm and long-term goals are connected.
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security concerns over upholding the rule of law. Whether this choice provides a
utilitarian benefit to the United States in terms of short-term and long-term national
security is yet to be seen. What is already clear, however, is that the United States
military commission system has created the perception that the type of trial—and,
therefore, the type of justice—accorded to a defendant depends not necessarily on a
belief in the equal protection of the law for all individuals, but more on the strength
of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution and the government’s
perception of whether a conviction can be easily guaranteed.
As the Obama administration continues to refine the military commission
system, it must bear in mind the trade-offs that are necessarily linked with the
decision to use specialized courts for terrorism trials. The administration may
ultimately decide that the continued alienation of targeted communities and the
international perception of a second-class system of justice for certain groups of
people within the United States is an appropriate price to pay for strengthening
national security through the use of military commissions. However, like other
nations that have used specialized courts in the past or continue to do so now, the
United States must come to terms with the compromises to the rule of law—and the
political and long-term security risks that may occur because of those
compromises—concomitant with the use of specialized courts that differ
significantly from the basic protections of the ordinary justice system.

